On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 01:44:32PM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Thu, 19 Sep 2013 20:59, jo...@netpage.dk said:
> > Yes, but it isn't only HIS stuff!
> You have to trust the recipient anyway that he keep the information
> confidential. It does not help to use string encryption if the message
> is
On Thu, 19 Sep 2013 20:59, jo...@netpage.dk said:
> Yes, but it isn't only HIS stuff!
You have to trust the recipient anyway that he keep the information
confidential. It does not help to use string encryption if the message
is later re-tweeted by the recipient. Unfortunately this is too often
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 7:44 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
> If Bobs decides to use NIST curve, why don't you want to send a mail to
> him. It his his decision whether he want to keep stuff confidential.
Yes, but it isn't only HIS stuff!
I want to know if the information I send out is secure enough or
On Wed, 18 Sep 2013 10:54, nicholas.c...@gmail.com said:
> If I understand correctly, the curve is used to create the
> Public/Private Keypair. So GPG probably needs to display clearly (in
The curve is part of the key. We have a similar thing in Elgamal and
DSA algorithms, over there we call it
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 6:44 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
>> to create the key (if that is possible) so that people can make a
>> judgement about that kind of thing when they certify keys -- assuming
>
> If Bobs decides to use NIST curve, why don't you want to send a mail to
> him. It his his decision
On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 9:33 AM, Josef Schneider wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 9:06 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>
>> The standard already allows for all kind of curses. They are specified
>> by an OID and I offered DJB to assign OIDs from the GnuPG arc. The
>> original reason why I wanted an OID
On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 9:06 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> The standard already allows for all kind of curses. They are specified
> by an OID and I offered DJB to assign OIDs from the GnuPG arc. The
> original reason why I wanted an OID based design is so that it will be
> possible to use Brainpool
On Tue, 17 Sep 2013 20:23, rookci...@gmail.com said:
> It's good to see that Werner has already made the suggestion to implement
> different curves. Let's hope that the OpenPGP working group agrees with his
The standard already allows for all kind of curses. They are specified
by an OID and I o
I second this motion. After the recent revelations about NSA shenanigans
regarding NIST and with Bruce Schneier himself saying he is highly
suspicious of NIST curves, I think it behooves the OpenPGP standards group
to think about alternative curves. Of course, some users of OpenPGP will
need NIST
On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 08:17:11PM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 9/13/2013 6:20 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
> > No, I am not aware of any discussions. QC resistant algorithms are not
> > yet something we need to rush for.
>
> Although it hasn't hit the IETF WG mailing list, I know that some list
On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 08:52:47AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
> - I am thinking to switch to Curve25519 based algorithms. They have
>been developed by Dan Bernstein et al. and are considered a sound
>design. I am currently working on the implementation of the signature
>scheme in Lib
On 9/14/2013 0:20, Werner Koch wrote:
> No, I am not aware of any discussions. QC resistant algorithms are not
> yet something we need to rush for.
While I agree that the current algorithms are probably safe against the
current attacks, encrypted messages can be stored and broken in the
future.
On 9/13/2013 6:20 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
> No, I am not aware of any discussions. QC resistant algorithms are not
> yet something we need to rush for.
Although it hasn't hit the IETF WG mailing list, I know that some list
participants have had intermittent off-list conversations about lattice
cry
On Fri, 13 Sep 2013 13:25, joh...@vulcan.xs4all.nl said:
> Such a major change would warrant a 1.6 IMO.
Sure.
> BTW, is there any discussion in the OpenPGP community about other public
> key systems, like NTRUEncrypt (see
No, I am not aware of any discussions. QC resistant algorithms are not
y
On 9/13/2013 8:52, Werner Koch wrote:
> concerns about switching to GnuPG-2. However, if at some time ECC would
> really take off, we might backport it to 1.4 if we could agree to change
> 1.4 to make use of Libgcrypt.
Such a major change would warrant a 1.6 IMO.
BTW, is there any discussion in
On Thu, 12 Sep 2013 07:35, d...@fifthhorseman.net said:
> GnuPG 2.1 (still currently in beta, afaict) is the first version to
> include ECC support for OpenPGP. the 2.0.x branch does not include ECC
Right. There are no plans to support it in older versions. 2.1 also
has a feature to work witho
On 09/11/2013 11:43 PM, Newton Hammet wrote:
> Shouldn't I be seeing 1 or more ECC choices?
GnuPG 2.1 (still currently in beta, afaict) is the first version to
include ECC support for OpenPGP. the 2.0.x branch does not include ECC
for OpenPGP.
Regards,
--dkg
signature.asc
Description
Hello Everyone,
I dutifully did ./configure, make, sudo make install for gunupg-2.0.21
after finally doing same for all its dependencies and then ran
/usr/local/lib/gpg2 --expert --gen-key
and all I got was this:
newton@newton-desktop:~/gpg2_0_21/gnupg-2.0.21$ /usr/local/bin/gpg2
--expert -
18 matches
Mail list logo
