On Mon, June 25, 2012 5:00 pm, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 06/25/2012 11:44 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>>> cracking the symmetric encryption used to protect the private key is
>>> comparable to the problem of cracking an encrypted message's session
>>> key.
>>
>> No, it is not. The entropy in a sess
On 06/25/2012 11:44 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
>> cracking the symmetric encryption used to protect the private key is
>> comparable to the problem of cracking an encrypted message's session
>> key.
>
> No, it is not. The entropy in a session key matches the size of the
> session key. The key used
On 06/25/2012 11:08 AM, Kevin Kammer wrote:
> Eventually being... the age of the Earth?
(I do not disagree with Kevin: this is an emphatic agreement.)
There is a minimum energy associated with flipping a bit -- something so
small that a single proton has the energy to flip about a trillion bits.
On Mon, 25 Jun 2012 17:08, lists.gn...@mephisto.fastmail.net said:
> cracking the symmetric encryption used to protect the private key is
> comparable to the problem of cracking an encrypted message's session
> key.
No, it is not. The entropy in a session key matches the size of the
session key
On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 09:15:14AM -0400 Also sprach Mark H. Wood:
> On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 02:10:07PM +0200, Jerome Baum wrote:
> > >> I'm going to lean very far out the window and assume he meant the actual
> > >> private key, not the private key-ring/-file/...
> > >
> > > I'm not sure I unders
On 10/19/2011 4:54 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> Because in the latter case, I hardly think commonality matters.
As an example:
Three years ago I was thrown into a week-long sink-or-swim course on
malware analysis, taught by an instructor who was a principal scientist
at a company that's a big name
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El 19-10-2011 17:54, Peter Lebbing escribió:
> On 19/10/11 22:43, Faramir wrote:
>> Ok, but if the online computer uses Windows, and the offline one
>> uses Linux, then it would be a multiplataform trojan horse...
>> that is not likely to be a commo
On 10/19/2011 4:43 PM, Faramir wrote:
> Ok, but if the online computer uses Windows, and the offline one
> uses Linux, then it would be a multiplataform trojan horse... that is
> not likely to be a common case.
At this point we're throwing conjecture onto conjecture. If the offline
one happened
On 19/10/11 22:43, Faramir wrote:
> Ok, but if the online computer uses Windows, and the offline one
> uses Linux, then it would be a multiplataform trojan horse... that is
> not likely to be a common case.
Define your threat model... are we talking random trojan infection or a focused
attacker
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El 18-10-2011 10:07, Peter Lebbing escribió:
...
> A capable enough hacker might infect the USB pendrive while it is
> in your internet-connected PC and that way still gain access to the
> non-connected system.
Ok, but if the online computer uses
On 10/17/11 5:18 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
> Hi everybody,
>
> what is the best way to protect
> your private key from getting stolen?
Page 29 (http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN513) of the Gnu
Privacy Handbook (http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html)recommends a
strong passphrase t
> I was pleased to see room for different classes of users in the STEED
> paper. When I encounter software that tries to be helpful, my own
> first thought is: how do I turn that off? But I recognized long ago
> that I was never a "typical" user and my own inclinations are no guide
> to populari
On Tue, 18 Oct 2011 15:19, r...@sixdemonbag.org said:
> Arguably we should be using 'certificate' to describe keys, but
We tried that in the Gpg4win manuals. However it turned out that this
term as other problems when used with OpenPGP keys (ah well, keyblocks).
> honestly, that's a losing batt
On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 04:23:42PM +0200, Jerome Baum wrote:
[snip]
> While we're discussing the STEED proposal in the other thread, do you
> think it's better to educate your users and risk loosing them or do you
> think it's better to provide "sensible" defaults for the "average"
> threat model a
On Tue, 18 Oct 2011 15:05, r...@sixdemonbag.org said:
> No, it's still a single file ("pubring.gpg", for instance, is the public
> keyring). I just can't promise that it's still a raw stream of RFC4880
> octets.
It still is for the public keys.
2.1 changes the format of the secring (well, dropp
On 10/18/2011 8:53 AM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
> I read a smartcard is simply a chip card. Why is it save, what's a
> PIN?
PIN: Personal Identification Number.
The idea is the secret key material is stored on the card, not on the
PC. The secret key material is located in write-only memory: f
> Right, that's a good point I think we all considered "trivial" when
> maybe we shouldn't have. In your threat model you should determine for
> how long your data should be safe (per attacker type) before you go
> ahead and make decisions about key protection.
To clarify, this is what we should t
> Well, not quite. Eventually you would get it. The task of security
> systems is to make "eventually" be longer than:
>
> o the payoff is worth; or
> o the time it takes to be discovered; or
> o the time it takes for the secured object to lose its value.
>
> Statistically, that is. You cou
> (a) is true, but it doesn't lead anywhere useful. That makes it
> trivial.
Seems like you keep asserting Jerome posed (a) as something insightful. I don't
remember someone other than you posing (a) at all.
I really see no point in keeping on telling people they said something different
than wh
On 2011-10-18 16:06, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
> Thanks to everyone for the helpful answers. Maybe I'll buy a
> smartcard, it seems more convinient than rebooting for every email.
What country are you in? For Germany, kernelconcepts sells the OpenPGP
card v2 and cryptoshop sells a very basic USB ca
On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 02:10:07PM +0200, Jerome Baum wrote:
> >> I'm going to lean very far out the window and assume he meant the actual
> >> private key, not the private key-ring/-file/...
> >
> > I'm not sure I understand the distinction you're making there.
>
> One is protected with a passph
Thanks to everyone for the helpful answers. Maybe I'll buy a smartcard, it
seems more convinient than rebooting for every email.
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I'm going to keep this as short as possible, because we've already hit
the point at which we're casting far more heat than light.
> Oddly, I don't recall Jerome ever making a statement remotely like
> "If I steal your decrypted key, ...". I only remember him stating
> that he thought, as did I, th
> It doesn't prevent a trojan from signing something other than what you
> intended (if it's your master key on card, even another key or a new
> sub-key) but whether this is a problem depends on your threat model.
I should mention that the current OpenPGP card spec doesn't let the card
know wheth
On 18/10/11 15:23, Jerome Baum wrote:
> It doesn't prevent a trojan from signing something other than what you
> intended (if it's your master key on card, even another key or a new
> sub-key) but whether this is a problem depends on your threat model.
The signature problem can still be solved by
On 18/10/11 15:08, Jerome Baum wrote:
> It's one thing to be picky when it adds to the discussion proper. That
> would be the case when we're distinguishing between the key as it is
> stored on disk (encrypted, inside a key-file/-ring/...) and the key as
> it is stored in memory (unencrypted). That
On 18/10/11 15:05, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> IIRC "nowadays" is store a separate file per key?
>
> No, it's still a single file ("pubring.gpg", for instance, is the public
> keyring). I just can't promise that it's still a raw stream of RFC4880
> octets.
ls ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/
Peter.
> If someone sniffs your PIN, and has trojaned or rooted your computer, he could
> use your smartcard while it is still plugged in to your computer, just like
> you
> are using your smartcard.
If you're worried about this you should be able to find a smartcard
reader with PIN entry that GnuPG sup
On 18/10/11 15:05, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 10/18/2011 8:36 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
>> Have you looked at my original statement?
>
> Yes.
Oddly, I don't recall Jerome ever making a statement remotely like "If I steal
your decrypted key, ...". I only remember him stating that he thought, as did
On 2011-10-18 15:05, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 10/18/2011 8:36 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
>> I recall making the distinction between a key* and a key-ring/-file,
>> not between a key-ring and a key-file.
>
> A distinction that has been lost on apparently everyone here. Please
> use accepted termin
On 10/18/2011 9:08 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
> Makes sense if there's no context. But there's context here --
> "cryptography". In that context, key means something specific.
This ain't EUROCRYPT or FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY. If you're reading
professional journals that are talking about crypto in pure
On 2011-10-18 14:48, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 18/10/11 14:36, Jerome Baum wrote:
>> * I'm going to take the word to mean what it says: "key", not what I can
>> flexibly interpret it as: "encrypted key".
>
> One of those metal things in my pocket? What good are they for encryption?
> Even
> if yo
On 18/10/11 14:53, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
> I read a smartcard is simply a chip card. Why is it save, what's a
> PIN? Say I'm using it on a PC with a trojan in the background
> that logs my keystrokes (my password) and can send data (my key)
> via internet to an attacker. How is access restr
On 10/18/2011 8:36 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
> Have you looked at my original statement?
Yes.
> I recall making the distinction between a key* and a key-ring/-file,
> not between a key-ring and a key-file.
A distinction that has been lost on apparently everyone here. Please
use accepted terminolog
Monday, October 17, 2011, 11:30:48 PM, Robert wrote:
> Smartcard and a good PIN. That's pretty much the gold standard. It's
> not the best way (there is no 'best way'), but it's generally an
> excellent place to start from.
I read a smartcard is simply a chip card. Why is it save, what's a
PI
On 18/10/11 14:36, Jerome Baum wrote:
> * I'm going to take the word to mean what it says: "key", not what I can
> flexibly interpret it as: "encrypted key".
One of those metal things in my pocket? What good are they for encryption? Even
if you manage to read it in, it still has way too little ent
On 2011-10-18 14:22, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 10/18/2011 8:10 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
>> If I manage to steal your private keyring, then yes the very strong
>> passphrase should grind my attempts to steal your key to a halt. If I
>> manage to steal your private _key_ OTOH, I don't need to get pa
On 10/18/2011 8:10 AM, Jerome Baum wrote:
> If I manage to steal your private keyring, then yes the very strong
> passphrase should grind my attempts to steal your key to a halt. If I
> manage to steal your private _key_ OTOH, I don't need to get past your
> passphrase as that doesn't come into pla
>> I'm going to lean very far out the window and assume he meant the actual
>> private key, not the private key-ring/-file/...
>
> I'm not sure I understand the distinction you're making there.
One is protected with a passphrase (i.e. it's encrypted), the other is
in the clear.
If I manage to st
On 10/17/2011 14:44, Jerome Baum wrote:
>> Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you
>> have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an
>> attacker almost no leverage. With a strong passphrase, the average
>> attacker isn't going to be able to break
On 10/17/11 5:18 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
> Hi everybody,
>
> what is the best way to protect
> your private key from getting stolen?
Page 29 (http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html#AEN513) of the Gnu
Privacy Handbook (http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual.html)recommends a
strong passphrase t
> Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you
> have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an
> attacker almost no leverage. With a strong passphrase, the average
> attacker isn't going to be able to break your key on modern hardware
> and anyone who
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:18 PM, wrote:
>
> what is the best way to protect
> your private key from getting stolen?
Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you
have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an
attacker almost no leverage. With a stron
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Jerome Baum wrote:
>> Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you
>> have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an
>> attacker almost no leverage. With a strong passphrase, the average
>> attacker isn't going to be a
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Jerome Baum wrote:
>> Your private key being stolen isn't really that big of a deal. If you
>> have a very strong passphrase, possessing your private key gives an
>> attacker almost no leverage. With a strong passphrase, the average
>> attacker isn't going to be a
On 10/17/11 5:18 PM, takethe...@gmx.de wrote:
> what is the best way to protect your private key from getting
> stolen?
Smartcard and a good PIN. That's pretty much the gold standard. It's
not the best way (there is no 'best way'), but it's generally an
excellent place to start from.
> 1. Using
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