justina colmena via Gnupg-users [2018-12-31 12:06:39-09] wrote:
> And now the *secret* keys are going in "~/.gnupg/pubring.gpg" with the
> false implication by its name that the file contains only public keys
> which need not be so carefully guarded against disclosure.
Secret keys are in director
Hello!
On Sun, 15 Oct 2017 22:35, gnupg-users@gnupg.org said:
> I've been looking for a way to provide GNUPGP with a custom
I assume you mean GnuPG.
> implementation of a key ring, as I gather there is such a thing as
> WKS, but I cannot find any documentation on how I can implement this
The W
On 10/15/2017 08:35 PM, Jamie H. via Gnupg-users wrote:
> ...I'd like to actually access GPG*as* a library, but all the tools
I see seem to invoke GPG as a program and then operate on its standard
output...
What you need is GPG as a pure crypto-engine; completely divorced from
all key manage
Hello,
I've been looking for a way to provide GNUPGP with a custom implementation of a
key ring, as I gather there is such a thing as WKS, but I cannot find any
documentation on how I can implement this myself.
What I need from GPG is a tool that does this:
1.) Sign Messages with a private key
On Thu, 20 Oct 2016 12:29, initra...@initramfs.io said:
> If I recall correctly, GPG private keys are stored under symmetric
> encryption where a PBKDF derives the symmetric encryption key,
> protecting the keys in case of compromise. Having separate passwords per
> subkey implies that each key is
aving separate passwords per
subkey implies that each key is encrypted and stored separately. This
does not seem to be the case with newer keys. Has the key storage method
changed? Or I am missing an obvious option to set it as such?
What's even more weird is that if I import my old master key int
On 02/20/2013 08:23 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> The current best attack on AES-256 maxes out at 11 rounds; the full
> AES-256 has 14 rounds.
Doing a little more research, I found a theoretical attack on the full
-256 and -192; I was wrong to say the current best attack only worked on
a reduced-r
On 02/20/2013 07:11 PM, Laila Vrazda wrote:
> Very well, theoretically AES-256 is less secure than AES-192.
The current best attack on AES-256 maxes out at 11 rounds; the full
AES-256 has 14 rounds. Nobody's ever demonstrated that full AES-256 is
easier to break than AES-192; and even if they had