Thanks - I knew I was being naive.
Is it correct that the thesis that describes the fundamentals of the
current reconciliation algorithm is 'Spreading Rumors Cheaply, Quickly, and
Reliably'?
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Hi MFPA,
> Would the attack work by just concatenating lots of identical
> signature packets onto a copy of the target key and sending the result
> to the keyserver?
I have no knowledge of the workings of the keyservers. But my guess is
that they would all be coalesced into the single signature t
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Hi
On Thursday 15 August 2019 at 7:07:34 AM, in
, Andrew
Gallagher wrote:-
> Also, if thousands of
> separate keys have
> signed another key, making it unusable, how do we
> decide which of
> those thousands of keys are legit and which the bad
> a
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Hi
On Thursday 15 August 2019 at 10:26:31 AM, in
, Peter
Lebbing wrote:-
> Plus, the attacker could just create a signature that
> looks likely to be
> real (self-sig or existing third-party sig seems a
> good candidate).
Would the attack work
On 15/08/2019 08:50, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Additionally, the bad guys can create new malicious certificates faster
> than the keyserver network can blacklist.
Plus, the attacker could just create a signature that looks likely to be
real (self-sig or existing third-party sig seems a good candid
> If the keyserver implemented a signer blacklist, (which would scrub the
> blacklisted signature from any current or incoming public keys), what
> consequences am I missing?
Someone already chimed in about how this is "enumerating badness", which
runs counter to best practices in security.
Addit
> On 14 Aug 2019, at 23:38, Daniel Clery wrote:
>
> If the keyserver implemented a signer blacklist, (which would scrub the
> blacklisted signature from any current or incoming public keys), what
> consequences am I missing?
This is known as “enumerating badness” and it doesn’t scale. You wou
If the keyserver implemented a signer blacklist, (which would scrub the
blacklisted signature from any current or incoming public keys), what
consequences am I missing?
In essence, shadowbanning a signing key. Keyservers without blacklist
support would still pass around the toxic keys, but only un
