Re: Design of a Modern Keyserver Network

2025-01-31 Thread Michael Richardson
andrewg wrote: > Speaking for the current SKS keyserver operators, it *is* currently > working. There are occasional glitches when vandals find a way around > our flooding protections, but we are constantly improving these. (I > realise I'm tempting fate by saying this...) But, t

Re: Design of a Modern Keyserver Network

2025-01-30 Thread andrewg via Gnupg-users
On 2025-01-30 11:29, Michael Richardson wrote: I think that that the place where we actually need to differ from the past is actually the flood-fill between key servers. I think that's probably not going to work. Speaking for the current SKS keyserver operators, it *is* currently working.

Re: Design of a Modern Keyserver Network

2025-01-30 Thread Michael Richardson
I was awake a bunch last night, and I was pondering the six points that Seth made. I am more and more concerned with having key servers have access to revocation (certificates), and I have no understanding how this will work with key server to key server communication. It seems to me that there

Re: Design of a Modern Keyserver Network

2025-01-29 Thread Jakob Bohm via Gnupg-users
I wonder if removing the UID information from a key is enough to be forgotten (vs the entire key). (Disclaimer: I am *not* a lawyer) I believe it should be enough to satisfy the right to be forgotten. According to Article 4(1) of the GDPR, "‘personal data’ means any information relating to an

Design of a Modern Keyserver Network

2025-01-27 Thread Seth McDonald via Gnupg-users
> Thank you for this post. > It's not particularly GNUPG specific, maybe this belongs on open...@ietf.org. Thanks, I'll give it a look! > Re Steps 3,4,5: > > * The keyserver sends the resultant hash to Alice via email using the email > address given on her public key's UID. > * Alice receives th

Re: Design of a Modern Keyserver Network

2025-01-20 Thread Michael Richardson
Thank you for this post. It's not particularly GNUPG specific, maybe this belongs on open...@ietf.org. Maybe your gist should become an Internet-Draft. Re Steps 3,4,5: * The keyserver sends the resultant hash to Alice via email using the email address given on her public key's UID. * Alice rece

Re: Design of a Modern Keyserver Network

2025-01-18 Thread Andrew Gallagher via Gnupg-users
Hi, Seth. On 17 Jan 2025, at 22:59, Seth McDonald via Gnupg-users wrote: > > To my understanding, it seems the vast > majority of keyservers (connected via the 'SKS network') were functionally > damaged due to a 2019 'certificate poisoning' attack, and were subsequently > shut down in 2021 due

Design of a Modern Keyserver Network

2025-01-18 Thread Seth McDonald via Gnupg-users
Hello all, For about the past month or two, I've been researching and teaching myself OpenPGP and GnuPG, which led to me attempting to find out what happened to all the keyservers over the past few years, since many resources on GnuPG reference keyservers which no longer function. To my understand