On 2025-01-03 1:25, Robert J. Hansen via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Let me get this straight: you believe Signal is acting unethically and
> irresponsibly by giving people a superb and secure alternative to SMS
> messaging, just because they don't support PQC.
Actually Signal uses PQC for some time now
Breaking RSA-4096 via Shor's algorithm is straight out of science
fiction.
No, *this* is science fiction:
I stand by my statement. RSA-4096 via Shor's requires science fiction
level technology advances.
Signal is acting ethically and responsibly: They have had hybrid-PQC
fully deployed to
d
to one side by default:
2025-01-01: Betamax v. VHS, and the future of PQ-PGP
https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2025-January/067441.html
This is not a nice wishlist feature that can wait. I sometimes try to
remember what messages I sent with RSA4096 decades ago, and wonder if
the
On Thu, 2 Jan 2025 19:25:01 -0500, Robert J. Hansen
wrote:
Breaking RSA-4096 via Shor's algorithm is straight out of science
fiction.
No, *this* is science fiction: It’s been known since 1977 that
factoring is merely an O(log n) problem, easy-peasy, if you have a
(classical) computer with
On 1/2/25 18:25, Robert J. Hansen via Gnupg-users wrote:
[...]
The lowest common denominator will remain plain ECC or RSA, as it
> is today. That’s bad.
Why? Breaking RSA-4096 via Shor's algorithm is straight out of
science fiction. It requires 8k qubits for the computation alone:
once
A disquisition could here ensue on the long-term security reasons why
everyone should start using ky1024_cv448 encryption subkeys RIGHT NOW.
This could only be true if everyone holds to a threat model in which
their data being collected by the MDR and potentially decrypted by a
First World nat
A disquisition could here ensue on the long-term security reasons why
everyone should start using ky1024_cv448 encryption subkeys RIGHT NOW.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massive_Data_Repository But if you
understand security well enough to read this list, why waste your time?
Instead, let’s
