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On Tue, Jun 13, 2006 at 06:46:48PM +0100, Tristan Williams wrote:
>
> Then it makes me wonder what is the purpose of the off card backup
> file sk_X.gpg created when the original private key was created via
> the on-card method?
>
Huh, according
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On Tue, Jun 13, 2006 at 06:55:17PM +0200, markus reichelt wrote:
>
> I'm not a smartcard user (somehow the concept hasn't been able to
> convince me ... yet), but what you write really sounds rather
> strange. Essentially you're saying: no backup
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On Tue, Jun 13, 2006 at 07:03:42PM +0200, markus reichelt wrote:
>
> Sorry, that was heat-induced and shall read of course as follows:
>
No need to apologize :)
>
> Essentially you're saying: a private key generated on/via a smartcard
> cannot
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On Tue, Jun 13, 2006 at 02:01:27PM +0100, Tristan Williams wrote:
> I am experimenting with the OpenPGP smartcard. I have two OpenPGP smart
> cards (smartA and smartB) and I want to verify that I can restore my
> on-card generated private key shou
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On Mon, Jun 12, 2006 at 08:36:54AM +0200, Remco Post wrote:
>
> Brute force... trying every possible key on a message until the
>
Brute force both in the key length and the size of the alphabet.
>
> decrypted message makes sense. Since in theory
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After several independent queries about my PKCS#11 patch to gpg 1.4, I've
decided to start an independent project and do the thing properly instead
of keeping the patch up-to-date.
The project aims to replace the scdaemon component of GnuPG 2 wit
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On Thu, May 18, 2006 at 09:27:10AM +0200, Werner Koch wrote:
>
> I can't remember whether the card checks for correct padding in
> internal_authenticate. If it does not, you may indeed use it to
> decrypt a message.
>
ok, i've just checked the v
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On Wed, May 17, 2006 at 10:46:32AM -0400, David Shaw wrote:
>
> You basically can't, unless you have a copy of your authentication key
>
Why not? Authentication is the same as encryption with private key which
amounts to decryption of the origin
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On Fri, Dec 23, 2005 at 09:32:28PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> I would rank the initial setup effort as 2, 1, 3, 4.
>
To followup on myself...
All your users will have to import your root certificate to stop SW
from complaining about un
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On Fri, Dec 23, 2005 at 06:47:56PM +0100, Thomas Widhalm wrote:
>
> I just got in charge of managing Linux- and Unix servers at the University of
> Salzburg (Austria) and one of my first tasks is to implement a secure way of
> exchanging email
On Wed, Nov 09, 2005 at 12:08:16PM -, Pete Croft wrote:
>
> I suspect it's a permissions problem: the source file for encryption
> exists, the key is correct, and the exact same command issued via CLI
> produces the output file as desired, so in the absence of other evidence
> I'm guessing th
On Wed, Oct 26, 2005 at 08:01:15PM +0100, Neil Williams wrote:
>
> I wouldn't sign the email only one because an email address can be accessible
> to more than one person. If I'm encrypting to this key, I want to know to
> WHOM I am writing.
>
In some cases you can't to WHOM you are writing. Wh
On Sat, Oct 22, 2005 at 11:12:01PM +0200, markus reichelt wrote:
>
> http://bitfalle.org/keys/gpg-key-signing-policy.php
>
I don't feel like reading the GNU documentation license, so a short
question: may I reuse and adapt this text to my own needs? [I'll give
you a proper credit]
>
> imagine y
On Sat, Oct 22, 2005 at 10:14:58PM +0100, Neil Williams wrote:
>
> ? That key has NO signatures other than yourself! There's no way anyone can
> trust it. There are NO paths.
>
It does, look at:
http://pks.aaiedu.hr:11371/pks/lookup?op=vindex&search=0x16DA1F1690887E13
http://pks.aaiedu.hr:11371/
On Sat, Oct 22, 2005 at 07:31:54PM +0100, Neil Williams wrote:
>
> That is exactly my point, NOBODY should rely on ANY of that information to
> identify a key. The only identifier for a key is the fingerprint. You MUST
> verify the fingerprint with the person and only then can you be sure that t
On Sun, Oct 09, 2005 at 03:11:56PM +, cdr wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >The point is that the statement about deniability is misleading (or maybe I
> >I should say, close to false).
>
> Zeljko, deniability has its place. It could be semantics, but perhaps you
> are not be making suffic
On Sat, Oct 08, 2005 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Jean-David Beyer wrote:
>
> But most people are ineffectively paranoid. They worry about eavesdropping,
> snooping, interception of their e-mail, but they absolutely refuse to do
> anything about it. I know no one personally that uses encrypted e-mail.
>
On Sat, Oct 08, 2005 at 08:01:15PM +0400, lusfert wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > On Sat, Oct 08, 2005 at 04:30:41PM +0400, lusfert wrote:
> >
> >>I know 2 cross-platform solutions: CrossCrypt
> >>
> >
> > A quote from the CrossCrypt homepage: "Denaiablity: You will not be able
> > to tell
On Sat, Oct 08, 2005 at 04:30:41PM +0400, lusfert wrote:
>
> I know 2 cross-platform solutions: CrossCrypt
>
A quote from the CrossCrypt homepage: "Denaiablity: You will not be able
to tell that this file has been encrypted by filedisk as it looks
completely random and can have any extension you wi
On Fri, Oct 07, 2005 at 01:13:07AM -0700, Eric wrote:
> On Fri, 2005-10-07 at 10:07 +0800, nidhog wrote:
> > Do you guys have any suggestion as to how to go about encrypting a
> > partition that can be available both to linux and win32?
>
> It's not easy to do this, and I don't think it will get a
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