On Wed, Oct 25, 2023 at 09:38:55PM -0500, Jacob Bachmeyer via Gnupg-users
wrote:
> raf via Gnupg-users wrote:
> > [...]
> > While testing these, I just noticed that /usr/bin/file
> > on my macOS-10.14 laptop shows a different keyid to
> > what libmagic shows. That&#
>
> Thanks, I was thinking about that. But I think simply using find, as
> suggested by Andrew and raf, is sufficient and simple.
rh intead of find+n*(sh+file+grep) is even simpler (but I'm biased). :-)
> > I think it is time to make things like this easier. Actually
>
oth use multiple additional
processes for each candidate file (either sh+file+grep
or sh+gpg+awk).
cheers,
raf
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blah.gpg.key23). Then you
don't need to look inside the file, and if it takes a
long time to re-encrypt lots of files, you can easily
see how it's progressing.
cheers,
raf
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sphrase, and then the same user logs in separately
via ssh to make use of it, systemd treats them as
different user sessions, each with their own gpg-agent,
and the second one has no access to the passphrase
setup for it by the first one. Presumably, this
need it to.
It might be possible to configure gpg-agent to use a
local script as the pinentry program, and that script
distinguishes between use in mutt and everything else
(perhaps by setting an environment variable whenever
mutt is launched), and then execs the preferred
p
xperimental thing
and is imho dead".
I think that experiment might have taken place at a time when DNSSEC
was too much effort to implement. That's not longer the case, so maybe
the experiment should be allowed to continue.
But maybe it is dead.
On Mon, Jan 03, 2022 at 08:19:26AM +0100, Werner Koch via Gnupg-users
wrote:
> Hello and a Happy Gnu Year!
Happy Gnu Year indeed!
Congratulations on the marvellous news,
and many thanks for all that you do.
cheers,
raf
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.
In Australia, voting is mandatory (yay! for now).
Someone I know once received a letter from the
gorvernment asking why they didn't vote, and at the
same time, their father, who had with the same name and
address, received a letter asking why they vot
d
>
> --pinentry-mode=loopback
>
> to the gpg invocation.
>
> Salam-Shalom,
>
>Werner
But be warned, loopback doesn't handle password retries after a failure.
If it did, it would be great. But for automation, that shouldn't matter.
cheers,
raf
_
On Sun, Oct 03, 2021 at 01:40:03PM +1100, raf wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 02, 2021 at 07:12:45PM -0400, Jack via Gnupg-users
> wrote:
>
> > Is it possible to add a passphrase to a secret key originally created
> > without one? If so, please tell me how. I'll be happy wi
ion?
>
> Thanks for any information.
>
> Jack
Try these instructions for changing the passphrase:
https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-unix-gpg-change-passphrase-command/
https://help.ubuntu.com/community/GnuPrivacyGuardHowto#Changing_your_Passphrase
gpg --edit-key Your-K
On Thu, Sep 02, 2021 at 01:10:40PM +0200, Ingo Klöcker wrote:
> On Donnerstag, 2. September 2021 01:28:42 CEST raf via Gnupg-users wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 01, 2021 at 01:50:36PM +0200, Ingo Klöcker
> wrote:
> > > On Mittwoch, 1. September 2021 07:55:21 CEST raf
On Wed, Sep 01, 2021 at 01:50:36PM +0200, Ingo Klöcker wrote:
> On Mittwoch, 1. September 2021 07:55:21 CEST raf via Gnupg-users wrote:
> > Why is the --auto-key-locate only for encrypting (says
> > the gpg(1) manpage)? Wouldn't it also be useful when
> > rece
Hi,
debian-11, gpg-2.2.27
Why is the --auto-key-locate only for encrypting (says
the gpg(1) manpage)? Wouldn't it also be useful when
receiving emails and verifying signatures?
cheers,
raf
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will) get it to transform gpg's
output itself, but I thought I'd ask.
cheers,
raf
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absence of
email, but I can't see what it is, and it hasn't been
explained (unless I missed that).
cheers,
raf
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paints the
picture well enough.
cheers,
raf
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s to it, and be thwarted. It
breaks the principle of least astonishment. But maybe
that won't be a problem, depending on the nature of
these other systems.
cheers,
raf
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and github.io requires a separate domain that you
control, where github.io only provides the web hosting.
It doesn't provide the email address. If you have a
domain that you control, you can easily avoid the
advanced method by not implementing it. Bu
On Sat, Jan 16, 2021 at 02:20:17AM +0100, Stefan Claas
wrote:
> On Sat, Jan 16, 2021 at 1:45 AM raf via Gnupg-users
> wrote:
>
> > But there is no certificate that covers that sub-sub-domain.
> > That's why browsers complain if you go to
> > https://openpgpkey
On Fri, Jan 15, 2021 at 07:56:26AM +0100, André Colomb wrote:
> Am 15. Januar 2021 01:56:04 MEZ schrieb raf via Gnupg-users
> :
> >But of course, you're not asking for that. You're just
> >asking for something to work. There must be other ways.
> >Accepting in
On Fri, Jan 15, 2021 at 07:56:16AM +0100, Stefan Claas
wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 15, 2021 at 2:04 AM raf via Gnupg-users
> wrote:
>
> [...]
>
> > I'm really not an expert, and the above might not make
> > any sense. I'm just thinking aloud.
>
> Me nei
dvanced" method as a "Stopgap method"
which is "Not recommended - but a temporary
workaround". So having an additional mechanism to
disable the "advanced" method sounds reasonable. Or
maybe the wiki page needs to be updated(?).
I'm really not an expert, and
ryone is sending you plain text. :-)
For everyone else, I recommend lots of phishing training
to mitigate the biggest risks of html email.
At least until gmail/outlook/etc. implement, by default,
the equivalent of Thunderbird's brilliant Torpedo
anti-phishing addon.
cheers,
raf
__
#x27;t secure
is an embarrassment.
I hate being told by websites that my 50 character
passphrase isn't secure enough, even more so when it
meets all of their stated password requirements (i.e.
they don't mention the fact that they don't accept
space characters as a special characte
hitecture mailing list.
You should consider engaging the services of security
architects who can analyse your environment in detail
and provide something as close to a solution as you can
afford. As rjh said, an actual solution is impossible
but you do what you can and what you can afford (a
false
> memories?
For gpg-agent 2.0.x I needed to use gpg --fingerprint --fingerprint xxx@xxx
to get the cache id to use with gpg-preset-passphrase --preset.
Since then, I need gpg2 --fingerprint --with-keygrip xxx@xxx.
So it probably changed from fi
nd pinentry-tty on debian-10 with gpg-2.2.12 but
neither prompt for the passphrase when invoked inside
vim or gvim, and the file is not decrypted.
Hopefully, I'm just ignorant and there is a solution
to my ergonomic issues (other than using loopback
and typing long
vedaal via Gnupg-users wrote:
> On 5/11/2020 at 6:15 PM, "Robert J. Hansen" wrote:
> >
> >This arrived in my inbox: I'm presenting it here without comment.
> >My
> >response will be following in a moment.
> >
> >
> > Forwarded Message
> >Subject: The GnuPR FAQ
> >Date:
part of the California government, not the US government.
If they are who you are referring to, you can contact
them to ask at https://www.bsis.ca.gov/about_us/contact_us.shtml
cheers,
raf
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Ralph Seichter wrote:
> * raf via Gnupg-users:
>
> > Does "--pinentry-mode loopback" make any difference?
>
> Where exactly do you suggest I add this option?
>
> -Ralph
Wherever it needs to be to get added to the gpg command line
when invoked from withi
> me the next time, parts of my input are echoed on the screen, and when I
> press return, the shell in pts/1 attempts to execute my pass phrase. It
> looks like pinentry died halfway, so my input ends up in the shell.
>
> I you have suggestions about how to s
ke money
by analysing email content to improve advertising
effectiveness so I can't see them doing it any time
soon.
cheers,
raf
> On 10/29/2019 7:33 PM, raf via Gnupg-users wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > Sorry if this was mentioned before but I've just come
> > a
but it looks like a promising
improvement in privacy that could help many more people
than just those that want to encrypt emails that they
send. And it's still relevant. I expect that those that
want to encrypt any emails that they send might also
like all the emails that they receive to
Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> some of you may remember the add-photo thread we had a while ago
> and I wondered why the max image size for a UAT packet is 16 MB.
>
> Recently I saw a Twitter post explaining that a .jpeg image header
> can contain 16 MB of data.
That's just d
Ángel wrote:
> On 2019-07-18 at 12:13 +1000, raf wrote:
> > At work, when a client insists on email, and I (or the law)
> > insist on encryption, I provide them with instructions for
> > installing 7-zip and send them an AES-256 encrypted zip or 7z
> > file as an at
Stefan Claas wrote:
> raf via Gnupg-users wrote:
>
> > Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users wrote:
> >
> > > Andrew Gallagher wrote:
> > >
> > > > * And finally: “don’t encrypt email”? Yes, well. Email is not going
> > > > away.
> >
Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users wrote:
> Andrew Gallagher wrote:
>
> > * And finally: “don’t encrypt email”? Yes, well. Email is not going away.
> > Just like passwords, its death has been long anticipated, yet never arrives.
> > So what do we do in the meantime?
>
> I think the biggest problems is
y
> those key-signature which we can verify and which are the latest from the
> same key (it is possible to sign a key several times to change meta data
> associated with the key-signature).
>
> Salam-Shalom,
>
>Werner
>
> --
> Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen
opefully they will.
Of course if gnupg could be changed in such a way that all email
clients were fixed automatically that would be great/efficient.
But I think the best thing gnupg can do is to suppress plaintext
output on MDC failure (as already mentioned by many) assuming
that that's even poss
Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> Hi raf--
>
> Hi On Wed 2017-12-20 14:11:26 +1100, gn...@raf.org wrote:
> > Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> >> On Mon 2017-12-18 20:01:02 +1100, gn...@raf.org wrote:
> >> > For most of my decryption use cases I can't use a
&g
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