; > If I use MD5, even for one message, that allows a moderately
> > determined attacker to replay that signature on what is likely to
> > become a fairly large set of messages. I'd rather avoid that, thank
> > you.
>
> You've *already done this*.
Reall
is, will GnuPG fall back to SHA-1 if it's not in my digest
preferences? I'd much rather fail to generate a signature than generate
one using an algorithm which is very weak.
[0] http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/641
--
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 27
ng it by any means. I still accept signatures on it and data
encrypted to it, just like I do with my v4 key.
--
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 9196 305B A994
the
same key ID, which kinda defeats the purpose.
--
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 9196 305B A994 7552 F1BA 225C 0223 B187
signature.asc
Description: D
nds you an unsigned encrypted message, there is no way
to verify that I came from who you think it did.
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brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 9196 305B A994 7552 F1BA 2
ally can't be done if the UID
has been published) and adding a new UID. If you want to do those two
steps, you have to do them manually.
--
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: RSA v
On Wed, Mar 14, 2012 at 01:05:53AM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 3/14/2012 12:44 AM, brian m. carlson wrote:
> > From looking at the source, I don't believe so. Note that the only case
> > in which you have more than one option is Windows/DOS.
>
> GnuPG compiles j
only case
in which you have more than one option is Windows/DOS. For other
platforms, the binary is always compiled in the ordinary way. I expect
exposing this information was not considered to be terribly important
since most platforms don't have this issue.
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brian m. carlson / bria
key. Then they can decrypt
> the original "C" contents from #1.
This doesn't work, because all you get is the output of the block
cipher. That doesn't tell you the key if the block cipher is secure.
--
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+
my sentbox,
> where the header you cite above says
>
> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I think what Werner is saying is to use quoted-printable encoding; then,
the space will be represented as =20 (when encoded) and it will be less
likely to get eaten by hungry mail-handli
On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 11:23:25PM +, MFPA wrote:
> On Monday 30 January 2012 at 7:06:43 PM, in
> , brian m.
> carlson wrote:
> > The problem is that unlike regular list messages, the
> > dupes don't come with the list headers, which makes
> > sorting them based
st messages, the dupes don't come
with the list headers, which makes sorting them based on the list
headers problematic.
--
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 919
ing on an OpenPGP library which may sprout a keyserver daemon
supporting this, but there's no guarantee that that will happen anytime
soon, if ever. Don't hold your breath.
--
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bm
MFPA wrote:
> On Monday 23 January 2012 at 12:47:03 AM, in
> , brian m. carlson
> wrote:
> > This is not a problem with OpenPGP because the attacker
> > never gets to see the value encrypted with RSA because
> > it's the symmetric key.
>
> Isn't that t
us other people, but I
have not verified the connection between that person's identity and key
myself, I use a local signature. That way I don't have other people
rely on my assertion if I haven't done the amount of checking that I
would like to before making a public statement.
-
m with
implementations that verify signatures only once and then cache the
results, but most implementations do not do that.
Also, there's nothing preventing people from actually signing data with
the primary key, so someone who is unfamiliar with your strategy might
accidentally use a single, v
#x27;t deal any
> damage?
Basically. The issue is that if the padding is incorrect, the message
is rejected. So the attacker can't manipulate the message without
risking corrupting the structure of the method.
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brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | ht
d different padding schemes, then all
implementations would have to support multiple padding schemes, which
would be burdensome without providing significantly more security.
--
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion
phrase and use salt (8 bytes of random data stored with the
passphrase to make the hash unique even if you reuse the passphrase).
This makes brute-force attempts slower since more computation is
required.
--
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www
the signature was made is different than the
original data.
* Someone made an error in the OpenPGP implementation.
--
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas, US
+1 832 623 2791 | http://www.crustytoothpaste.net/~bmc | My opinion only
OpenPGP: RSA v4 4096b: 88AC E9B2 9196 305B A994 7552 F1
fairly confident that you have a good PRNG, such as /dev/urandom,
then there's not really much concern about k. After all, you also need
a good PRNG for CFB IVs as well, although the consequences aren't as
disastrous.
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brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, T
print would change every time you added a new ID or signature,
which would not be hhelpful.
If you need to be able to compute the fingerprint independently, you'll
need to parse the public key packet and follow the formula specified in
RFC 4880. It's not terribly difficult.
--
brian m.
seems silly and
wasteful, plus it prevents the storage of multiple, separate keyrings in
one directory (like /usr/share/keyrings). If you would like to use the
--homedir method, nothing is preventing you from doing that. But
breaking existing infrastructure will go over like a lead balloon.
--
ation) actually give any credence to the left two whatsoever?
If there's an OpenPGP implementers' list or another, more appropriate
forum, please feel free to point me in that direction. I couldn't find
one, so I posted here.
--
brian m. carlson / brian with sandals: Houston, Texas
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