ic analysis. It has merely
> some provisions to help such a system
>
Thanks Werner - we agree on the OpenPGP design. I'm only trying to
point out that this is a serious limitation, more so now than at the
time PGP was born (or OpenPGP was designed).
Tempora mutantur (et nos in illis?)
Nik
, by default, consist of a binary data set, indistingushable from a
random stream, until and unless decrypted using the recipient's private key.
NikNot
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g all (to him)
usefull information from the flow of messages. Consequently, the
question should not be what pgpdump will or will not produce, the
question should be what information is or is not contained in the
message previous to its decryption.
NikNot
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a threat that may be
naively ignored only in geek kindergartens, but not in the real life.
NikNot
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d whatsoever to protect the identity of
the secret key holder (and, by extension, that traffic analysis - as
opposed to the secret content analysis - is not something to be
concerned with).
NikNot
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are building your own applications that have
nthing to do with PGP). Piping data through GPG is not a solution that
our users would appreciate.
NikNot
On 2/9/07, Werner Koch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Fri, 9 Feb 2007 12:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
>
> > - Does libcrypt do t
