On 20/10/11 12:30, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
...Shirley Gaw, Ed Felten and Patricia Fernandez-Kelly
had a wonderful paper a few years ago, "Secrecy, Flagging, and Paranoia:
Adoption Criteria in Encrypted Email"...
Thanks for the link, interesting reading. The quote from the paper that
follows de
> Over the last year Marcus and me discussed ideas on how to make
> encryption easier for non-crypto geeks.
> We prepared a short paper...
Interesting. However, the problem of widening email encryption
practice is not technical, it is motivational.
Broadly speaking, there are those that "have no
On 17/10/11 01:37, Doug Barton wrote:
On 10/16/2011 14:37, sweepslate wrote:
It's sort of hard to understand what you're trying to accomplish,
can you give us more details?
To me, it is perfectly obvious what the OP is trying to accomplish:
perform the encryption by supplying the cryptographic
On 22/09/11 19:59, ved...@nym.hush.com wrote:
I'm booting from a dvd ubuntu install disk.
Yes, there are many threat models where operating from
a PC that is unknown to the attacker to be associated
with the particular target user will be easier to achieve
than preventing the attacker to subver
I agree with you to some extent. I also happen to believe there are
ways of tamper-resistant distribution of binaries that require the
trust in the application provider and no one else; at least not
someone else in the distribution channel. In addition, the ability
of an average end-user to inspec
On 16/09/11 23:20, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
My question, though, is -- why? What do the MS compilers give us?
I can't see any compelling reason to do this.
How about a large user base that already has that tool set at
hand, and has a natural resistance to install another tool set
they are not f
I wish application developers would understand
a simple fact: language choice can't be computer-wide,
it must be *application specific*.
Mark R.
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On 03/05/11 15:50, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
Dropbox exposes your secret
keys to dropbox employees (and anyone who can convince them to snoop):
http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2011/04/how-dropbox-sacrifices-user-privacy-for.html
That article makes no sense at all.
a) Storing files containing yo
On 28/04/11 13:40, Johan Wevers wrote:
I'm not so sure. Especially for human rights activists in, say, Syrie or
Tibet, might not want the government to know when they are mailing with
foreign journalists.
Quite probably, but I do not consider myself qualified to comment
on trials and tribulatio
For most individuals who really *need* (as opposed to those
that do it as a matter of ideology or principle) to protect
their communication, the need to keep confidential who is
communicating with whom is as important as is the protection
of the content.
Current "secure computer communication sys
On 02/28/2011 07:07 AM, Denise Schmid wrote:
...The background of my question is that a company claims that one of their
> managers has forgotten the key and therefore, they can't decrypt some
files.
Do you know what program was used to encrypt the files?
Mark R.
_
On 02/25/2011 03:15 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
I do *not* consider PGP/MIME harmful for mobile.
They might not be harmfull for ~your~ mobile...
Any mail with attachments is likely to be harmful for mobile.
You just don't know what device and what program will be used to
read your mail and
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