Re: Making the case for smart cards for the average user

worker in Syria wants to communicate securely with, say, an academic in the U.S., we have to figure out a simple way to introduce that person to the tools as well. [1]: https://github.com/josecastillo/signet/blob/master/guidelines.md#certification-and-trust -- Joey Castillo www.joeycastillo

Re: Making the case for smart cards for the average user

. exports controls are complex and quite nonsensical from the perspective of the uninitiated professional software developer." [1]: http://www.opensslfoundation.com/export/README.blurb -- Joey Castillo www.joeycastillo.com ___ Gnupg-users mailing list

Re: Making the case for smart cards for the average user

establish a shared secret to secure the channel, as proposed in a 2010 standard. [2] [1]: http://events.iaik.tugraz.at/RFIDSec06/Program/papers/002%20-%20Security%20in%20NFC.pdf [2]: http://www.ecma-international.org/publications/files/ECMA-ST/ECMA-386.pdf -- Joey Castillo www.joeycastillo.com

Making the case for smart cards for the average user

t people's computing is moving anyway. Of course smart cards aren't some kind of magic bullet, but if the goal is to drive wider adoption of GnuPG and OpenPGP based cryptography, I can't shake the feeling that smart cards are a huge part of the answer. Thoughts? -- Joey Cast

Re: Whishlist for next-gen card

l-spec.pdf in item 2.4.7, "Key History Object". -- Joey Castillo www.joeycastillo.com ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users

Specifying passphrase for batch key generation

Reading the manual for batch GPG key generation in GnuPG 2.1, I see the following note: > Since GnuPG version 2.1 it is not anymore possible to specify a passphrase > for unattended key generation. The passphrase command is simply ignored and > ‘%ask-passpharse’ is thus implicitly enabled. I'm