Robert J. Hansen wrote:
Brian Smith wrote:
It is reasonable to choose to protect a secret for the rest of one's life
(~100 years).
You're committing two logical fallacies here: the first is you're begging
the question, and the second is the assumption of facts not in evidence.
Robert J. Hansen wrote:
Brian Smith wrote:
It is reasonable to choose to protect a secret for the rest of one's life
(~100 years).
You're committing two logical fallacies here: the first is you're begging
the question, and the second is the assumption of facts not in evidence.
David Picón Álvarez wrote:
From: "Robert J. Hansen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
I see no reason to add "features" to GnuPG that have no connection to
any real-world need. Changing the largest keysize, even in expert mode,
has no connection to any real-world need I've ever heard anyone
articulate, and s
Richard Hartmann wrote:
> > I don't see how a keysigning party works. Anybody that
> > participates by showing ID is reducing their personal
> > privacy by divulging their personal information.
>
> The basic assumption is that a key signing is good and that
> you actually gain something from it
Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Because of these three factors--no semantic meaning
> associated with certification levels, some OpenPGP
> implementations not supporting the distinctions, and many
> implementations making it easy to forget that such
> distinctions exist--my default policy is to treat
Peter Palfrader wrote:
> Nice idea. When trying to find decent backup methods for my
> new Tor identity key I cam accross this thread.
>
> I played all day with ocr and friends. In the course I wrote
> a small script that does what you suggest. I tried to keep
> it small enough to print it a
Werner Koch wrote:
> * Switched license to GPLv3.
Why was the license switched to GPLv3? And, who made this decision?
Thanks,
Brian
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Snoken wrote:
> I checked with the source:
> http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2004
>
> In 2003 users of RSA 1024-bit keys were advised to drop them
> before 2010. Now the situation is somewhat worse than it
> looked in 2003.
That is not what the RSA website says. The website says, more-or
Werner Koch wrote:
> > It took me infinitely longer to type the pass-phrase for the signing
> > than it took to actually create the sigs which seemed to be almost
> > instantaneous. Timing the signing is sort of ridiculous
>
> That is true for your desktop box. However, for small
> devices
Snoken wrote:
> I suppose this means that 1024 bit RSA-keys are ridiculous
> and the Open PGP Card is a joke. And what about all web sites
> protected by SSL with a 1024-bit RSA-certificate?
This seems to be more-or-less on schedule:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_size#Asymmetric_algorithm_key
10 matches
Mail list logo
