Hello. Thanks for your reply. I am aware of the first method as well as
a variation of the second (it had not occurred to me that they both can
use the same key!; I had thought that each correspondent used one key of
his own with a meaningless ID and used only for communication with the
other corre
On 30/08/17 00:57, Stefan Claas wrote:
> If your communication partners would use the same software, like opmsg.
>
> https://github.com/stealth/opmsg
>
> Or if you would use Bitmessage instead of classic email, then
> you have authenticated/encrypted messages too and can later
> nuke your keys, i
On 30/08/17 21:35, Mario Castelán Castro wrote:
> (2) can be signed
> without deniablity implications, but is not necessary.
Apologies. The authentication code should not be signed either to keep
full deniability.
--
Do not eat animals; respect them as you respect people.
https://duckduckgo.com/?
Hello.
Your message is very bad written and I can barely understand it. I will
answer what I have understood.
On 30/08/17 10:40, miz...@elude.in wrote:
> ***
> hi all,
>
> i do not clearly understand the difference between .asc , .gpg , .sign ,
Hello,
I am investigating how to use GnuPG in a content_filter. I found an old
post
https://lists.gt.net/gnupg/users/53184
where the linear search through the keyring was mentioned as a scaling
problem
for the number of keys. That would probably hit us too. If I've seen it
correctly, the keyb
***
hi all,
i do not clearly understand the difference between .asc , .gpg , .sign ,
.sig , cert and do not know the official_usage & conventions.
i made my own research before but ... unsuccessfully.
i built my curve keys using these commands_o
On 30/08/17 12:39, Stefan Claas wrote:
> But then it would be imho advisable that you use a different timestamp (time
> in the future), because when verifying the published message the timestamp
> would be earlier than the time the sec key would have appeared on the net,
> right?
Either the timest
Am 30.08.2017 um 11:43 schrieb Peter Lebbing:
With a little scripting, you could create a new ECC keypair (fast!)
for each
message, sign the keypair with your normal key, sign the message with the ECC
keypair. And when you want to backpedal on a signed message, publish the private
ECC key and s
On 30/08/17 11:34, Mario Figueiredo wrote:
> Examples are
> dictatorships, and many forms of human relationships, including job
> relations.
I don't think a repudiable message lets you off the hook in those examples
either, least of all the dictatorship...!
> If one wants to use deniability with
On Tue, 29 Aug 2017 14:33:46 -0400
"Robert J. Hansen" wrote:
> You can prove origination *only if* you can prove the originating PC
> was not compromised. Given how common compromise is today -- a few
> years ago Vint Cerf estimated one in four desktop PCs was compromised
> -- this is a very hig
10 matches
Mail list logo
