On 17-06-12 05:45 PM, Stefan Claas wrote:
> On 12.06.17 22:35, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>>> Is there something like a Standard Operating Procedure for GnuPG
>>> available, which fulfills security experts demands, and which can
>>> easily be adapted by an average GnuPG user, regardless of platform
On 12.06.17 22:35, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Is there something like a Standard Operating Procedure for GnuPG
>> available, which fulfills security experts demands, and which can
>> easily be adapted by an average GnuPG user, regardless of platform
>> and client he/she uses?
> No. More to the po
> Is there something like a Standard Operating Procedure for GnuPG
> available, which fulfills security experts demands, and which can
> easily be adapted by an average GnuPG user, regardless of platform
> and client he/she uses?
No. More to the point, there can't be. Each user faces threats
sp
On 12.06.17 22:10, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> and transfer signed/encrypted messages from my online usage
>> computer with a USB stick to my offline computer and verify
>> decrypt the messages there. :-)
> If you think your online computer may be compromised, then you have no
> business sharing USB
> and transfer signed/encrypted messages from my online usage
> computer with a USB stick to my offline computer and verify
> decrypt the messages there. :-)
If you think your online computer may be compromised, then you have no
business sharing USB devices between it and your believed-safe comput
On 12.06.17 21:15, Peter Lebbing wrote:
>> (Remember there are two types of companies. Those who know they got
>> hacked and those who don't know yet that they got hacked.)
>>
>>
I should put that as a signature in my email and Usenet client! :-)
Regards
Stefan
On 12.06.17 21:21, Ludwig Hügelschäfer wrote:
> What you can do: Learn, learn by playing, learn by trying to
> understand what others write and by asking questions and become a
> reasonable critical user. That's the hard way, but you learn best.
> Second possibility would be to have a good experien
On 12.06.17 21:15, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 12/06/17 20:51, Stefan Claas wrote:
>> Maybe as an additional security feature Enigmail should give
>> a key with a set trust level of "Ultimate" a different color than
>> green.
> No, that's beside the point. Once somebody gets your user privileges,
> t
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
On 12.06.17 20:51, Stefan Claas wrote:
> On 12.06.17 20:18, Ludwig Hügelschäfer wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On 12.06.17 14:52, Stefan Claas wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Ludwig,
>>>
>>> I just checked again. On my Mac and on my Windows Notebook i
>>> get a green bar ,
On 12/06/17 20:51, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Maybe as an additional security feature Enigmail should give
> a key with a set trust level of "Ultimate" a different color than
> green.
No, that's beside the point. Once somebody gets your user privileges,
there is no "additional security". It's game over
On 12.06.17 20:18, Ludwig Hügelschäfer wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 12.06.17 14:52, Stefan Claas wrote:
>
>> Hi Ludwig,
>>
>> I just checked again. On my Mac and on my Windows Notebook i get a
>> green bar , from a blue "Untrusted" key when i go into Enigmails
>> Key Management and set the trust of that key
Hi,
On 12.06.17 14:52, Stefan Claas wrote:
> Hi Ludwig,
>
> I just checked again. On my Mac and on my Windows Notebook i get a
> green bar , from a blue "Untrusted" key when i go into Enigmails
> Key Management and set the trust of that key to Ultimate...
Well, ultimate ownertrust is the wrong
Please note: I have changed the Subject: of the thread to match better
the real problem.
During generating the keys on the GnuPG card, one can (and should)
create some backup of the secret key into a file. It is totally unclear
to me how to make something usefull out of this file, for example im
On 12.06.17 17:28, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> I agree with you and it makes perfect sense, but then it would raise
>> another question. How should an average user of GnuPG, like me,
>> then handle this.
> It cannot be the job of the GnuPG team to teach people how to safely
> administer their oper
> I agree with you and it makes perfect sense, but then it would raise
> another question. How should an average user of GnuPG, like me,
> then handle this.
It cannot be the job of the GnuPG team to teach people how to safely
administer their operating system. There are too many operating
systems
> If Mallory would get somehow access to my Computer and replace one
> pub key from my communication partners with a fake one and sets the
> trust level to Ultimate. How can i detect this, if i'm not always
> looking at the complete Fingerprint and compare it with a separate
> list?
If Mallory can
On 12.06.17 16:31, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> I hadn't gotten round to answer your earlier questions yet, since I
> noticed a point I should first spend some effort and thinking on.
>
> On 12/06/17 16:14, Stefan Claas wrote:
>> And a question for this... If Mallory would get
>> somehow access to my Com
I hadn't gotten round to answer your earlier questions yet, since I
noticed a point I should first spend some effort and thinking on.
On 12/06/17 16:14, Stefan Claas wrote:
> And a question for this... If Mallory would get
> somehow access to my Computer and replace one pub key from my
> communica
On 12.06.17 16:06, Peter Lebbing wrote:
> On 12/06/17 14:52, Stefan Claas wrote:
>> I just checked again. On my Mac and on my Windows Notebook
>> i get a green bar , from a blue "Untrusted" key when i go into
>> Enigmails Key Management and set the trust of that key to
>> Ultimate...
> Don't do thi
On 12/06/17 14:52, Stefan Claas wrote:
> I just checked again. On my Mac and on my Windows Notebook
> i get a green bar , from a blue "Untrusted" key when i go into
> Enigmails Key Management and set the trust of that key to
> Ultimate...
Don't do this! Or did you do it just for testing? "Ultimate
On 07.06.17 22:23, Ludwig Hügelschäfer wrote:
> Hi Stefan,
>
> On 06.06.17 22:19, Stefan Claas wrote:
>> On 06.06.17 20:46, Charlie Jonas wrote:
>>> On 2017-06-06 19:12, Stefan Claas wrote:
I tried also with Enigmail under OS X but when checking the
signatures here from the list members
El día lunes, junio 12, 2017 a las 01:28:28p. m. +0200, Damien Goutte-Gattat
escribió:
> On 06/12/2017 07:31 AM, Matthias Apitz wrote:
> > Now we are on track with my question. The background is/was: what
> > exactly I have todo with this backup key, for example in case the GnuPG
> > card gets lo
I forgot an important detail:
On 06/12/2017 01:28 PM, Damien Goutte-Gattat wrote:
First, remove the private key stubs:
$ rm ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/*.key
This command will delete *all* your private keys. You should use it "as
is" only if *all* your private keys are stored on a smartcar
On 06/12/2017 07:31 AM, Matthias Apitz wrote:
Now we are on track with my question. The background is/was: what
exactly I have todo with this backup key, for example in case the GnuPG
card gets lost or stolen?
You would have to import your backup key into your private keyring using
gpg's --imp
On Mon, 12 Jun 2017 12:38, g...@unixarea.de said:
> Do you know of any other CCID reader for ID-000 size cards?
I have a sample of the Gemalto Shell Token here. It has been around for
quite some time and the kernelconcept folks that it works nicely. See
https://www.floss-shop.de/en/security-
El día domingo, junio 11, 2017 a las 08:59:37p. m. +0200, Werner Koch escribió:
> On Fri, 9 Jun 2017 08:39, g...@unixarea.de said:
>
> > I know, this is not a GnuPG issue, but I wanted to mention it here to
> > ask if others has similar experiences, even on Linux or other OS, or if
> > it worth
Hi Peter,
Thank you very much for your email. It has answered a lot of the queries I had.
Going forward, I think I may be able to wrap this all up in a PowerShell script
to enable the removal of the original files and the required error checking.
Most likely I will create a temp csv from the co
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