about how the MUA mutt signs mails

2017-05-31 Thread Matthias Apitz
Hello, When I send signed mails to me with the MUA mutt (just for test) the received mail is verified fine in mutt, i.e. it says in mutt: [-- Begin signature information --] Good signature from: Matthias Apitz (GnuPG CCID) created: Wed May 31 21:40:19 2017 [-- End signat

Re: PGP for official documents / eIDAS and ZertES

2017-05-31 Thread Daniel Pocock
On 31/05/17 19:34, ankostis wrote: > On 31 May 2017 at 15:14, Daniel Pocock wrote: >> >> Are the CMS, PDF or XML standards flexible enough that a PGP signature >> could be used within any of them and thereby satisfy the legislation? > > IANAL, but I would agree with Reiner that the implementing

Re: Don't send encrypted messages to random users

2017-05-31 Thread MFPA
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On Tuesday 30 May 2017 at 8:42:04 PM, in , Michael Englehorn wrote:- > Also, it would be strange to only publish your key's > "name only" UID to the > keyserver, because then at a keysigning event I > wouldn't know where to > send your public key

Re: Errors at ECC key generation in non-interactive mode

2017-05-31 Thread Ryru
Hi Daniel, On 31.05.2017 21:47, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > do you see the same error messages when you use the more modern --quick > command-line syntax? I was not aware of this syntax style. Thank you. fpr=$(gpg --with-colons --quick-gen-key "Test user " ed25519 | awk -F: '/^fpr:/{ print $1

Re: Errors at ECC key generation in non-interactive mode

2017-05-31 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Hi Ryru-- On Wed 2017-05-31 18:18:56 +0200, Ryru wrote: > I get these errors while trying to create a new ECC key: > > $ gpg --batch --gen-key Desktop/params-ecc.txt > gpg: key ABCDEFABCDEFABCD marked as ultimately trusted > gpg: error reading rest of packet: Invalid argument > gpg: error reading

Re: PGP for official documents / eIDAS and ZertES

2017-05-31 Thread ankostis
On 31 May 2017 at 15:14, Daniel Pocock wrote: > > Are the CMS, PDF or XML standards flexible enough that a PGP signature > could be used within any of them and thereby satisfy the legislation? IANAL, but I would agree with Reiner that the implementing acts are not technology-neutral. More detaile

Re: PGP for official documents / eIDAS and ZertES

2017-05-31 Thread Rainer Hoerbe
> Am 31.05.2017 um 15:14 schrieb Daniel Pocock : > > Are the CMS, PDF or XML standards flexible enough that a PGP signature > could be used within any of them and thereby satisfy the legislation? > Or could any of those standards potentially be amended/extended to allow > use of PGP signatures?

Errors at ECC key generation in non-interactive mode

2017-05-31 Thread Ryru
Hi List I get these errors while trying to create a new ECC key: $ gpg --batch --gen-key Desktop/params-ecc.txt gpg: key ABCDEFABCDEFABCD marked as ultimately trusted gpg: error reading rest of packet: Invalid argument gpg: error reading rest of packet: Invalid argument gpg: can't encode a 256 bi

Re: Certification-only key

2017-05-31 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 31/05/17 14:52, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote: > Right to be forgotten. The signatures I made a long time ago were made > by a different person, although there is a continuity between the > two. Talking about not forgetting, you answered after seven years?! :-D I don't think expiring a signing subk

Re: Certification-only key

2017-05-31 Thread Lionel Elie Mamane
On Mon, Oct 04, 2010 at 10:45:02AM -0700, Doug Barton wrote: > On 10/4/2010 8:22 AM, Lionel Elie Mamane wrote: >> Also, when my signature subkey expires, it would (I guess) silently >> start using the primary. Which makes me_very_ happy I chose to make >> my primary certification-only, because si

Re: PGP for official documents / eIDAS and ZertES

2017-05-31 Thread Daniel Pocock
On 31/05/17 13:54, Rainer Hoerbe wrote: > Hi Daniel, > > The eIDAS regulation is replacing the national e-signature laws to make > signatures (besides other other things) interoperable across borders. > While the law is fairly technology-neutral, the implementation acts have > to reference speci

Re: Obtaining sig2 and sig3 signatures

2017-05-31 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On Wed 2017-05-31 12:00:25 +0200, Stefan Claas wrote: > Am 31.05.2017 um 03:43 schrieb Phil Pennock: >> It's unfortunate really that the default is to make public attestations, >> telling the world "trust me, this key belongs to this person" instead of >> locally useful data and then, only once som

Re: PGP for official documents / eIDAS and ZertES

2017-05-31 Thread Rainer Hoerbe
Hi Daniel, The eIDAS regulation is replacing the national e-signature laws to make signatures (besides other other things) interoperable across borders. While the law is fairly technology-neutral, the implementation acts have to reference specific technologies, which are CMS, PDF- and XML signa

Re: PGP for official documents / eIDAS and ZertES

2017-05-31 Thread Stefan Claas
Am 31.05.2017 um 12:18 schrieb Daniel Pocock: Hi Stefan, Thanks for sharing these. Unfortunately my German skills are not great, could you make any comment about those companies? In particular, - does a signature from either of these comply with eIDAS (and therefore ZertES)? - what effort

Re: PGP for official documents / eIDAS and ZertES

2017-05-31 Thread Daniel Pocock
On 30/05/17 22:17, Stefan Claas wrote: > > > On 30.05.17 08:05, Daniel Pocock wrote: >> >> Does anybody know of certificate authorities who are willing to sign PGP >> keys or has anybody ever looked into making that happen? > Hi Daniel, > > please check those two links: > > https://pgp.govern

Re: Obtaining sig2 and sig3 signatures

2017-05-31 Thread Stefan Claas
Am 31.05.2017 um 03:43 schrieb Phil Pennock: It's unfortunate really that the default is to make public attestations, telling the world "trust me, this key belongs to this person" instead of locally useful data and then, only once someone knows what they're doing, offering them the option to act

Re: Obtaining sig2 and sig3 signatures

2017-05-31 Thread Stefan Claas
Am 31.05.2017 um 01:22 schrieb Damien Goutte-Gattat: Hi, On 05/30/2017 09:25 PM, Stefan Claas wrote: The classical procedure would be to sign a key with a sig3 after seeing the persons id-card in a real meeting. But who guarantees that the id-card is not fake (if the person is a complete stran

Re: Obtaining sig2 and sig3 signatures

2017-05-31 Thread Stefan Claas
I don't recommend that anyone make a sig1, sig2, or sig3 for any third-party certification (sig3 is fine for self-signatures, where the keyholder asserts their own identity). sig0 -- the default, generic certification -- is fine, does what people need of it, and doesn't intentionally leak any m