Re: configure warnings and errors upon ./configure for Pinentry v0.9.7

2016-11-22 Thread David Adamson
On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 4:16 AM, Werner Koch wrote: > >> configure: error: No pinentry enabled. > > You need to install the appropriate development package for the GUI > platform. > > > Salam-Shalom, > >Werner > > -- > Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. Werner was GTK

Re: configure warnings and errors upon ./configure for Pinentry v0.9.7

2016-11-22 Thread David Adamson
On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 8:15 PM, Stephan Beck wrote: > Ah, I forgot one thing: you have to add the following to your ~/.bashrc > file: > GPG_TTY=$(tty) > export GPG_TTY > > Does it work now? > > HTH > > Stephan Stephan I updated the .bashrc file in my home directory, still got the same error, so

Re: Implications of a common private keys directory in 2.1

2016-11-22 Thread Carola Grunwald
"Robert J. Hansen" wrote: >> gpg is intended to run on the client, not the server. A mail service >operator >> should not hold the private keys of its users, never mind perform >encryption >> operations on their behalf. I would question the design of your >architecture if >> you feel this is nece

Re: How to prevent passphrase caching in 2.1

2016-11-22 Thread Carola Grunwald
Peter Lebbing wrote: >On 22/11/16 17:20, Carola Grunwald wrote: >> They don't have any system account at all. These are users of a >> messaging system, only allowed to access its POP3, SMTP and NNTP >> service. > >Perhaps 1.4 is the best release for you... you'll miss out on Elliptic >Curve, but

Re: How to prevent passphrase caching in 2.1

2016-11-22 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On Tue 2016-11-22 11:20:26 -0500, Carola Grunwald wrote: > They don't have direct access to any key. Nevertheless by using someone > else's cached passphrase with 2.1 and its all-embracing keyring they may > succeed in decoding data not meant for them. fwiw, the same concerns hold for a shared gpg

RE: Implications of a common private keys directory in 2.1

2016-11-22 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> gpg is intended to run on the client, not the server. A mail service operator > should not hold the private keys of its users, never mind perform encryption > operations on their behalf. I would question the design of your architecture if > you feel this is necessary. I concur. This post is agr

Re: How to prevent passphrase caching in 2.1

2016-11-22 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 22/11/16 17:20, Carola Grunwald wrote: > They don't have any system account at all. These are users of a > messaging system, only allowed to access its POP3, SMTP and NNTP > service. Perhaps 1.4 is the best release for you... you'll miss out on Elliptic Curve, but other than that, it's still a

Re: Implications of a common private keys directory in 2.1

2016-11-22 Thread Andrew Gallagher
On 22/11/16 18:17, Carola Grunwald wrote: > You seriously recommend to run a dedicated gpg-agent instance for each > of dozens if not hundreds of mail service users? gpg is intended to run on the client, not the server. A mail service operator should not hold the private keys of its users, never m

Re: Implications of a common private keys directory in 2.1

2016-11-22 Thread Carola Grunwald
Peter Lebbing wrote: >On 22/11/16 02:54, Carola Grunwald wrote: >> - In a multi-user environment the key owning recipient has to be granted >> access to the private key with some sender being restricted to only use >> the public key no matter whether there's any chance s/he guesses the >> correct

Re: How to prevent passphrase caching in 2.1

2016-11-22 Thread Carola Grunwald
Peter Lebbing wrote: >On 21/11/16 15:20, Carola Grunwald wrote: >> As for each single decryption task only a defined passphrase is >> allowed to be used it's essential to have caching, which implicates >> the risk of unauthorized passphrase usage, strictly deactivated. > >Why do you lump these us

Re: Implications of a common private keys directory in 2.1

2016-11-22 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 22/11/16 02:54, Carola Grunwald wrote: > - In a multi-user environment the key owning recipient has to be granted > access to the private key with some sender being restricted to only use > the public key no matter whether there's any chance s/he guesses the > correct passphrase. That's what fi

Re: How to prevent passphrase caching in 2.1

2016-11-22 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 21/11/16 15:20, Carola Grunwald wrote: > As for each single decryption task only a defined passphrase is > allowed to be used it's essential to have caching, which implicates > the risk of unauthorized passphrase usage, strictly deactivated. Why do you lump these users together? At a first glan

Re: GPGSM detached signature without auth attributes

2016-11-22 Thread Jernej Kos
Hello! On 22. 11. 2016 08:06, Werner Koch wrote: > That is unfortunate because all modern implementations use the > indirect signing method (using the attribute 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4). > GPGSM is able to verify the old direct signing method but it can't > create such an old signature. This explain

Re: GPGSM detached signature without auth attributes

2016-11-22 Thread Stephan Beck
Hi, Jernej Kos: > Hello! > > Not sure about what you mean with the OpenPGP card not supporting > signing? I have set gpgsm to use the signing key on the OpenPGP card (in > key slot 1) for generating X509 certificates and CMS (S/MIME) signatures > by doing: > > gpgsm --learn-card > gpgsm --ge

Re: GPGSM detached signature without auth attributes

2016-11-22 Thread Werner Koch
On Sun, 20 Nov 2016 20:47, jer...@kos.mx said: > detached CMS signature. The kernel requires that the CMS does not > contain any authenticated attributes and it refuses to validate the > signature otherwise [1]. That is unfortunate because all modern implementations use the indirect signing metho

Re: GPGSM detached signature without auth attributes

2016-11-22 Thread Jernej Kos
Hello! Not sure about what you mean with the OpenPGP card not supporting signing? I have set gpgsm to use the signing key on the OpenPGP card (in key slot 1) for generating X509 certificates and CMS (S/MIME) signatures by doing: gpgsm --learn-card gpgsm --gen-key And selecting an existing ke