Re: What am I missing? (Again)

2016-03-30 Thread listo factor
On 03/30/2016 12:16 PM, listo factor - listofac...@mail.ru wrote: > I do not use this device, so I am wondering... There was a quite a few posts following my question, but unfortunately those quickly drifted off to the aspects of this case (good/bad government(s), compelling rich/poor vendor(s).

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread MichaelQuigley
"Gnupg-users" wrote on 03/30/2016 03:25:55 PM: > - Message from "Robert J. Hansen" on Wed, > 30 Mar 2016 14:08:18 -0400 - > > To: > > Peter Lebbing , gnupg-users@gnupg.org . . . . . . . . . > > If you

RE: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread bob cavanaugh
Group, Although this is off-topic, I have to jump in... Robert is being reticent about the state-of-the-art regarding shall we say "data recovery". While I will adopt the same level of reticence (probably for the same reasons) let me state my firm belief that the FBI could have applied to other US

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> BTW, "Johann" with 2 n's is the German spelling. In Dutch it's only 1 > n at the end. I apologize; I meant no disrespect. > I didn't see this from the legal files, but did the FBI used these > precedents in court? The particular case I cited was just one of many times the government used the

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> The core point is: they wanted more than just this phone. But they > said it was only about this phone. That's the core point you're making, and I have no opinion on it. > Is this "conspiracy theory" outrageous? Or only the one where they > wanted legal precedent? The latter. They believed t

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> If it was only software, where the AES key is stored? And why not copy > the storage? iPhones put memory in tamper-resistant hardware. I'll note that tamper-resistant isn't tamper-proof. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Johan Wevers
On 30-03-2016 20:08, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > My position: "The FBI already had precedent on their side from clubbing > other smaller companies, and they decided they finally had enough legal > support to go after the big fish: Apple." I didn't see this from the legal files, but did the FBI used

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Peter Lebbing
On 30/03/16 20:08, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Johann's position: "The FBI wanted to get precedent on their side so > they could use it as a club against other smaller companies." I'll just speak for myself. My position: I think the FBI wanted something that could be /reused/ later, not just for thi

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Matthias Apitz
El día Wednesday, March 30, 2016 a las 01:26:23PM -0400, Mauricio Tavares escribió: > On Wed, Mar 30, 2016 at 1:13 PM, Peter Lebbing > wrote: > > (I think this is too far off-topic actually, but hey) > > > > On 30/03/16 15:46, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > >> I try not to get involved in conspiracy

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Mauricio Tavares
On Wed, Mar 30, 2016 at 1:13 PM, Peter Lebbing wrote: > (I think this is too far off-topic actually, but hey) > > On 30/03/16 15:46, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> I try not to get involved in conspiracy theories, but this one's just... >> outrageous. > > Can I ask why the conspiracy theory is "outrag

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> Can I ask why the conspiracy theory is "outrageous"? Yes. You and Johann seem to be of the opinion the FBI's petition was unusual. It wasn't, really, except in the fact that they were going after someone who had the resources to fight it, and they were asking for just a little bit more than Ap

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Paolo Bolzoni
Actually I thought there is a TPM that is needed to "talk" with the storage. If one fails to input the password enough times, the TPM destroys the key. You can say that it is false that the storage get destroyed but, since it AES encrypted, after destroying the key it is pretty much the same. If i

Re: EasyGnuPG

2016-03-30 Thread Werner Koch
On Wed, 30 Mar 2016 10:05, b...@pagekite.net said: > FYI, on the latest Ubuntu (15.10), that command does not work: You need 2.1 of course .-) > https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gpgme/UI-Server-Protocol.html, > it looks like that protocol is only suitable for localhost > operations, i

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Peter Lebbing
(I think this is too far off-topic actually, but hey) On 30/03/16 15:46, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I try not to get involved in conspiracy theories, but this one's just... > outrageous. Can I ask why the conspiracy theory is "outrageous"? Can't you imagine that the FBI, or at least part of it, wo

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> Why would this be an outragious conspiracy theory? Because it assumes the FBI is stupid. Conspiracy theories which require the conspirators are morons are very rarely correct. > The smaller company would probably not have gone to court over it and > just complied, so it would not set a legal p

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Johan Wevers
On 30-03-2016 15:46, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> The FBI wanted clearly an easy access to ALL devices and a court ruling >> to force other companies into compliance... > I try not to get involved in conspiracy theories, but this one's just... > outrageous. Why would this be an outragious conspira

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> The FBI wanted clearly an easy access to ALL devices and a court ruling > to force other companies into compliance... I try not to get involved in conspiracy theories, but this one's just... outrageous. So, let's assume the FBI wanted a court ruling to force other companies into compliance. Wh

Re: All mails identified as spams by Google

2016-03-30 Thread sverker wahlin
I'm in the process of setting up my webmail services, and have been digging through quite a lot of standards. It seems to me that gnupg.org's mail servers do not have any SPF/DKIM/DMARC records in the DNS. These are authentication standards issued by IETF, and are meant to stop spam and authentica

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> What am I missing in this whole case? As I might someday want to work in the field of digital forensics again, I'm going to keep my mouth shut about this specific case. But speaking generally ... Bruce Schneier is fond of saying that experience in breaking ciphers is necessary before someone c

Re: What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread Johan Wevers
On 30-03-2016 14:16, listo factor wrote: > If this is all essentially correct, someone who knows that > the content of his device-at-rest is extremely valuable to an > attacker would surely use a pass-phrase of adequate length, and > thus make a potential cooperation from the device builder to > h

Re: How do you think the FBI managed to get the clear text of the infamous phone?

2016-03-30 Thread Johan Wevers
On 30-03-2016 13:28, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> AFAIK the Cellbrite hack works by replacing the boot manager and so >> being able to overwriting system memory, just as custom recoveries do on >> Android phones. > > It's also worth noting that we'll likely discover what the exploit was > in the ne

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2016-03-30 Thread Susan Scheerer
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What am I missing?

2016-03-30 Thread listo factor
I do not use this device, so I am wondering if those that are familiar with it may be kind enough to confirm my understanding of its security architecture: The device uses a protected hardware module, which does several things: 1) It uses it's own secret, etched in silicone, in combination with

Re: How do you think the FBI managed to get the clear text of the infamous phone?

2016-03-30 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> AFAIK the Cellbrite hack works by replacing the boot manager and so > being able to overwriting system memory, just as custom recoveries do on > Android phones. It's also worth noting that we'll likely discover what the exploit was in the next few weeks. ___

Re: How do you think the FBI managed to get the clear text of the infamous phone?

2016-03-30 Thread Johan Wevers
On 30-03-2016 11:31, Paolo Bolzoni wrote: AFAIK the Cellbrite hack works by replacing the boot manager and so being able to overwriting system memory, just as custom recoveries do on Android phones. -- ir. J.C.A. Wevers PGP/GPG public keys at http://www.xs4all.nl/~johanw/pgpkeys.html _

Re: How do you think the FBI managed to get the clear text of the infamous phone?

2016-03-30 Thread Johan Wevers
On 30-03-2016 11:31, Paolo Bolzoni wrote: > The TPM contains the AES key protected with the password, AFAIK on the iPhone 5c at last the password this is not in some special TMP. Only the iPhones with a fingerprint scanner (5s and above) have that hardware and should not be vulnerable to that kin

How do you think the FBI managed to get the clear text of the infamous phone?

2016-03-30 Thread Paolo Bolzoni
Dear list, I am aware it is out topic, but still I assume as we are security oriented people (otherwise why being part of this email list?) I think it is interesting food for thought. As far as I understood the situation is: The iPhone uses AES (256?) to encrypt the storage. The phone owner, p

Re: EasyGnuPG

2016-03-30 Thread Bjarni Runar Einarsson
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi Werner, Thanks for the reply! Werner Koch wrote: > > This is one of the complaints/wishes us Mailpile folks had, for > > some sort of stable socket/stdio-based programmatic API for > > talking to GnuPG. This sort of interface would make it much m