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El 23-01-2015 a las 0:29, Robert J. Hansen escibió:
>>> Smartcards exist to keep private keys safe(r) from being
>>> stolen. They do a pretty good job of that. But when we expect
>>> smartcards to be able to somehow make a compromised environment
>>
I didn’t mean to include the word “complete” in there - true, there are degrees
of
control that somebody else can have over your computer. I don’t
think this tells us anything in relation to the original problem, and besides
from
a practical point of view there are some simple steps people can t
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Hello,
Well, some months ago I wanted to take a look at existing
smartcards and/or readers that hopefully support both OpenPGP and x503
certificates, but my Google-Fo failed me, I couldn't figure out where
to buy something that works on Windows
>> Smartcards exist to keep private keys safe(r) from being stolen.
>> They do a pretty good job of that. But when we expect smartcards
>> to be able to somehow make a compromised environment safe to
>> operate in, then we've crossed the line and turned them into magic
>> crypto fairy dust.
>
> I was referring to exactly that - *somebody else* having "complete
> control" over your hardware, remotely. There are degrees of that...
There aren't. It's like saying someone's a "little bit pregnant". You
have complete control, or you have less-than-complete control. There
are degrees of
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El 22-01-2015 a las 20:43, Robert J. Hansen escibió:
> Smartcards exist to keep private keys safe(r) from being stolen.
> They do a pretty good job of that. But when we expect smartcards
> to be able to somehow make a compromised environment safe t
On Thu 2015-01-22 16:28:06 -0500, NdK wrote:
> I proposed to add a button to FST-01 ages ago (IIRC it still was just a
> project on Seeedstudio...), as "user presence test", and am having a
> look at implementing it. But I received the programmer too late and now
> I have a more demanding (and real
> That's not what the original poster was positing, though: the original
> poster was positing *someone else* had complete control -- and trying to
> make a system that works in that environment is a fool's errand.
I was referring to exactly that - *somebody else* having "complete
control" over y
> The attack you describe is significantly more complex and more
> visible than the attack the original poster outlined.
Right: that's because the original poster outlined an attack which was,
in my opinion, naive.
If Eve can read arbitrary memory locations on your desktop PC without
your knowled
> There are degrees of “control over your hardware” and complete
> control hardware is rarely going to happen.
That's not what the original poster was positing, though: the original
poster was positing *someone else* had complete control -- and trying to
make a system that works in that environmen
On Thu 2015-01-22 13:44:12 -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> To prevent such an attack, I imagine a device where I have to
>> confirm every transaction with a simple push on a hardware button.
[...]
>
> Once you lose control of the hardware, you're done.
The attack you describe is significantly m
There are degrees of “control over your hardware” and
complete control hardware is rarely going to happen.
If the concerns voiced by some developers about the
randomness quality of Intel’s hardware random
number generator (RNG) around the time of the
Snowden leaks are true
http://arstechnica.com/
Il 22/01/2015 21:08, Daniel Kahn Gillmor ha scritto:
> If anyone is considering adding this kind of feature to the FST-01, i'd
> be happy to test and debug it with them.
I proposed to add a button to FST-01 ages ago (IIRC it still was just a
project on Seeedstudio...), as "user presence test", and
On Thursday 22 January 2015 17:00:44 Felix E. Klee wrote:
> However, there
> is one attack which I think could be easily prevented: With the card
> in the reader, the PIN entered, and Eve having remote access to my
> machine, she could sign and decrypt documents.
Are you sure? On my setup, the sma
On Thu 2015-01-22 12:00:44 -0500, Felix E. Klee wrote:
> I currently use GnuPG with an OpenPGP Card V2.0 in a smart card reader
> with PIN pad. Surely, that adds a certain layer of security, as all
> encryption and signing operations happen on the card. However, there
> is one attack which I think
> To prevent such an attack, I imagine a device where I have to
> confirm every transaction with a simple push on a hardware button.
This attack can't be prevented.
Once the attacker has control over your hardware, you're done. Game
over. People keep on trying to invent ways to do crypto even o
On Thu, Jan 22, 2015 at 6:00 PM, Felix E. Klee wrote:
> I currently use GnuPG with an OpenPGP Card V2.0 in a smart card reader
> with PIN pad. Surely, that adds a certain layer of security, as all
> encryption and signing operations happen on the card. However, there
> is one attack which I think
I currently use GnuPG with an OpenPGP Card V2.0 in a smart card reader
with PIN pad. Surely, that adds a certain layer of security, as all
encryption and signing operations happen on the card. However, there
is one attack which I think could be easily prevented: With the card
in the reader, the PIN
I’ve been having the same problem. No solution yet ☹
/Jesper
From: Hideki Saito
Sent: Thursday, January 22, 2015 01:00
To: gnupg-users@gnupg.org
Cc: Jesper Hess Nielsen
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Also I'd like to add that this seems to affect when gen
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