On 6/26/2014 5:57 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> PGP 8 was released over a decade ago, that's hardly a modern
> implementation:
And yet, it still conforms (largely) to RFC4880. Methinks you're
objecting because it's a largely-conforming implementation that doesn't
have good support for SHA256.
On 06/26/2014 05:45 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> On 6/26/2014 2:25 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>> If you know of a modern OpenPGP implementation that supports SHA-1 but
>> not SHA-256 or SHA-512, please point it out (and no, creating one just
>> to be able to point to it doesn't count :P)
>
>
On 6/26/2014 2:25 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> If you know of a modern OpenPGP implementation that supports SHA-1 but
> not SHA-256 or SHA-512, please point it out (and no, creating one just
> to be able to point to it doesn't count :P)
PGP 8.x, which is still in use today by a surprising numb
On 6/26/2014 4:35 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
> You mean except for that you must be capable of forging a mainkey
> signature (if you don't control the sending system anyway in which case
> you don't need the key any more)?
Nope. :) I meant what I said.
The preference list on the key is advisory,
On June 26, 2014 8:26:16 AM PDT, Daniel Kahn Gillmor
wrote:
>As for arguments about use on smartcards -- if you plan to get a
>smartcard, and you have a primary key that is too large for it, you can
>always generate and publish new subkeys that will fit in your
>smartcard.
>If that's the tradeof
Am Do 26.06.2014, 16:06:25 schrieb Robert J. Hansen:
> Since it's possible to degrade the cipher preference to 3DES,
> we need to assume that's exactly what will happen. (Your next
> objection is "How?". That's a non-sequitur right now. I believe
> serious adversaries can do this because (a) the
On 6/26/2014 11:26 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> The pushback of "don't bother using stronger crypto, something else
> will be your problem" seems silly to me. It's like saying "don't
> bother fighting sexism, people are going hungry!" We can (and
> should) push on all of these fronts concurre
On 06/24/2014 07:28 AM, Gabriel Niebler wrote:
> I consider myself quite the amateur (I haven't even read most of RFC
> 4880 yet), but I do take issue with one point in the riseup.net Best
> Practices page, namely the bit where it says "self-signatures must not
> use SHA1".
> I find that statement
> The goal of this document is to encourage people to make sure that
> crypto is not the weak point in their communications.
If that's your criteria, RSA-1024 is sufficient. Real systems are so
exploitable that crypto is never the weak point.
> Please read Bernstein's paper suggesting larger ke
On 06/26/2014 10:26 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> So in a very real sense, anything past RSA-2048 is at best a "you
> *might* get some additional security, depending on what symmetric
> algorithm your correspondent uses. Oh, and you can't forbid your
> correspondent from using 3DES, either."
Of c
On 06/25/2014 02:25 AM, Werner Koch wrote:
> This misunderstanding is actually an indication of the problem. You are
> talking 4096 vs. 2048 while the more important case is to read the
> security announcements and update your gpg.
That's a great point. I've just proposed a pull request on that
> While in principle I agree that 2048 bit key is strong enough for most
> uses, comparing 3DES keys space (or any other symmetric encryption
> algorithm) and RSA (or some other public key system) key space is a
> bit like comparing apples and oranges. If you crack the 3DES
> encryption of a messag
On 06/26/2014 04:26 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Ah, yes... the fetish of equinonecroflagellation. It has an
>> strikingly common rate of incidence with maxicryptosizism...
>
> Although I'm going to be (almost wholly) agreeing with John here,
> I'm speaking just for myself. If anyone wants to c
> Ah, yes... the fetish of equinonecroflagellation. It has an strikingly common
> rate of incidence with maxicryptosizism...
Although I'm going to be (almost wholly) agreeing with John here, I'm
speaking just for myself. If anyone wants to chime in with a
"d'accord," that's on them. :)
What get
Robert J. Hansen wrote:
>> Even if they did intercept them, are the Americans any good at
>> interrogating a horse?
>
> Yes. We are world champions at beating dead horses. To interrogate a
> horse, first simply shoot it in the head, and then we can leverage our
> dead-horse-beating skills in ord
MFPA:
> Hi
>
>
> On Tuesday 24 June 2014 at 8:37:30 PM, in
> , Johan Wevers wrote:
>
>
>> Al Quaida use horse couriers who memorise the
>> message, the American's could not intercept them.
>
> Even if they did intercept them, are the Americans any good at
> interrogating a horse?
might be o
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