Re: Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

2014-01-19 Thread Mr. Clif
Hi Doug, Thanks for the comments. Yes the threat model is mostly the worry of having old temp files or even the original cleartext files left behind on the HD, or even worse having them backed up. ;-) At the very least I want something that tries to protect me from stupid mistakes. Yep the RA

Re: Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

2014-01-19 Thread Doug Barton
On 01/19/2014 08:56 AM, Mr. Clif wrote: So I'm trying to get a sense from the users here if they feel that the process of using gpg for symmetric encryption is safe enough, and they are not worried about leaving clear text behind. I think you're misunderstanding a few things. First, the problem

Re: Reusing signed user ID or attribute

2014-01-19 Thread Daniele Ricci
Thank you Daniel, it actually sounds very right. Now that I think about it, storing this kind of data in the public key block isn't so good afterall. I will investigate over this and ask to the right ML next time. Thank you everyone for your help. On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 5:21 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillm

Re: Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

2014-01-19 Thread Mr. Clif
On 01/19/2014 03:53 AM, Johan Wevers wrote: On 19-1-2014 7:50, Mr. Clif wrote: Does anyone use symmetric file encryption? Yes, but only for encrypting files for personal use. Not in communication with others. Same here. This is why I wrote that perl script, so I wouldn't have to remember

Re: Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

2014-01-19 Thread Johan Wevers
On 19-1-2014 12:12, Andy Ruddock wrote: > I wouldn't like to make any claims about "best practice", for the most > part I rely on defaults provided by more knowledgeable folks than myself. Although trust in that approach has gotten some drawback since the actions of RSA Inc. became public knowled

Re: Reusing signed user ID or attribute

2014-01-19 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
On 01/19/2014 09:55 AM, Daniele Ricci wrote: > Ok, so I have to conclude it's implementation specific? > I'm using a custom user attribute to store something that can change > quite often (privacy lists for a chat user). What do you suggest? I don't know what a "privacy list for a chat user" is.

Re: Reusing signed user ID or attribute

2014-01-19 Thread Hauke Laging
Am So 19.01.2014, 15:55:51 schrieb Daniele Ricci: > Ok, so I have to conclude it's implementation specific? > I'm using a custom user attribute to store something that can change > quite often (privacy lists for a chat user). What do you suggest? My first thought is: Why should it make sense to pu

Re: Reusing signed user ID or attribute

2014-01-19 Thread Daniele Ricci
Ok, so I have to conclude it's implementation specific? I'm using a custom user attribute to store something that can change quite often (privacy lists for a chat user). What do you suggest? On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 1:28 PM, Hauke Laging wrote: > Am Fr 17.01.2014, 11:44:55 schrieb Daniele Ricci:

gnupg binaries too big? / OpenBSD Moving Towards Signed Packages — Based On D. J. Bernstein Crypto

2014-01-19 Thread Mark Schneider
Hi, Is there any possibility to create a minimal version of gnupg? http://bsd.slashdot.org/story/14/01/19/0124202/openbsd-moving-towards-signed-packages-based-on-d-j-bernstein-crypto # --- /"It's official: 'we are moving towards signed packages

Re: Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

2014-01-19 Thread Andy Ruddock
I use ecryptfs, as packages are available for my distro (Debian) which make it easy to install and use. I wouldn't like to make any claims about "best practice", for the most part I rely on defaults provided by more knowledgeable folks than myself. Mr. Clif wrote: > So no one got back to me. >

Re: Looking for simple wrapper for symmetric key file encryption

2014-01-19 Thread Johan Wevers
On 19-1-2014 7:50, Mr. Clif wrote: > Does anyone use symmetric file encryption? Yes, but only for encrypting files for personal use. Not in communication with others. > What is the best practice here? As always, that depends on your use case and threat model. > I heard of another solution whic