- User brian m. carlson on 2012-01-23 00:47:03 wrote:
>> * sending ciphertext with the same "e" to several recipients
>This depends on a small message. All secure padding schemes avoid this
>problem because the pad the message so it is not small.
>> * no randomness
>All secure padding schemes
Holger wrote:
> 2012-01-22T16:11:14-08:00, Doug Barton:
>> On 01/22/2012 10:05, Holger wrote:
>> > I intend to use gpg only for receiving encrypted e-mail, not signing
>> > my outgoing e-mail. Because I don't want my name or e-mail address
>> > out there on the keyservers,
>>
>> Why not?
>
> One
2012-01-22T16:11:14-08:00, Doug Barton:
> On 01/22/2012 10:05, Holger wrote:
> > I intend to use gpg only for receiving encrypted e-mail, not signing
> > my outgoing e-mail. Because I don't want my name or e-mail address
> > out there on the keyservers,
>
> Why not?
One reason is spam, though we
On Sun, Jan 22, 2012 at 11:29:54PM +0400, Sergey Matveev wrote:
> >If the standard allowed different padding schemes, then all
> >implementations would have to support multiple padding schemes, which
> >would be burdensome without providing significantly more security.
> Hmm, I see. However does it
On 01/22/2012 10:05, Holger wrote:
> Hello gnupg-users,
>
> I intend to use gpg only for receiving encrypted e-mail, not signing
> my outgoing e-mail. Because I don't want my name or e-mail address
> out there on the keyservers,
Why not?
> I want do create a key without a uid.
> People who want
On Jan 22, 2012, at 1:05 PM, Holger wrote:
> Hello gnupg-users,
>
> I intend to use gpg only for receiving encrypted e-mail, not signing my
> outgoing e-mail. Because I don't want my name or e-mail address out there on
> the keyservers, I want do create a key without a uid. People who want to s
- User brian m. carlson on 2012-01-22 18:54:22 wrote:
>GnuPG uses PKCS #1 v1.5. This is specified in RFC 4880.
>You cannot choose a different padding scheme and remain in compliance
>with the OpenPGP standard.
Ah! I see. Thank you! Now I understand.
>If the standard allowed different padding
On Sun, Jan 22, 2012 at 07:48:28PM +0400, Sergey Matveev wrote:
> As I understand, such asymmetric ciphers as RSA and/or ElGamal requires
> strong padding applied before "message" is encrypted. Message is of
> course the one-time session key, used to encipher the actual data.
To use them correctly
On 1/22/2012 11:59 AM, Holger wrote:
> Will this work or did I miss something?
The OpenPGP spec (RFC4880) says that a transferable public key (one that
can be shared, basically) is required to have one or more user IDs
attached (RFC4880 section 11.1). If you don't have a user ID on your
certifica
Hello gnupg-users,
I intend to use gpg only for receiving encrypted e-mail, not signing my
outgoing e-mail. Because I don't want my name or e-mail address out there on
the keyservers, I want do create a key without a uid. People who want to send
me e-mail, get my e-mail address and keyID/finger
Mega sorry for the triple post.
H
___
Gnupg-users mailing list
Gnupg-users@gnupg.org
http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Hello gnupg-users,
I intend to use gpg only for receiving encrypted e-mail, not signing my
outgoing e-mail. Because I don't want my name or e-mail address out there on
the keyservers, I want do create a key without a uid. People who want to send
me e-mail, get my e-mail address and keyID/finger
Hello list,
I intend to use gpg only for receiving encrypted e-mail, not signing my
outgoing e-mail. Because I don't want my name or e-mail address out there on
the keyservers, I want do create a key without a uid. People who want to send
me e-mail, get my e-mail address and keyID/fingerprint w
Greetings everyone!
As I understand, such asymmetric ciphers as RSA and/or ElGamal requires
strong padding applied before "message" is encrypted. Message is of
course the one-time session key, used to encipher the actual data.
There are different versions of PKCS#1, NESSIE, OAEP and other schemes
On 22/01/12 02:49, Aaron Toponce wrote:
> Yes. That's all I'm after. I think the militant "I _absolutely_ won't sign
> any keys unless I verify their identification, face-to-face" attitude is
> hindering adoption. There must be a way to build the WOT, while still
> allowing people to sign keys wit
Hi Aaron, gnupg users,
* Aaron Toponce [21. Jan. 2012]:
> On Sat, Jan 21, 2012 at 10:50:11PM +0100, Gregor Zattler wrote:
>> IMHO by signing a key you make a statement about the connection
>> between a person or owner and the user id you sign, saying "I
>> somehow convinced myself that user owns t
On 21/01/12 23:01, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> Then they're signing it with *their* certificate, backed up by
> credentials that you yourself checked. How is this a problem?
While I generally agree with you on the rest of your mail, this is not
necessarily the case. You met them at a keysigning par
17 matches
Mail list logo
