Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread Jim Dever
On 1/11/2010 1:26 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > I've seen computerized votes authenticated by MD5 hash... sent over > email... in the same message as the official vote record. As in, "the > attachment has MD5 hash XXX, if your version hashes out to XXX then the > vote record is authenticated." I

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 01/10/2010 10:57 PM, Faramir wrote: >> * How hashes are misused and shouldn't be used > Ehh... I've never thought about it. How they should not be used? I've seen computerized votes authenticated by MD5 hash... sent over email... in the same message as the official vote record. As in, "the a

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread Jim Dever
On 1/10/2010 11:37 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> >> What is your point Robert? > > I didn't write this; you're misquoting someone else's words and > attributing them to me. > I think he meant the other Robert in the discussion. -- Jim ___ Gnupg-us

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread Faramir
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Robert J. Hansen escribió: ... > Crypto is not like this. Sure, you don't need to understand Feistel > networks or large number theory in order to use crypto, but look at what > you *do* need to understand: > > * Identity verification I think I u

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 01/10/2010 11:01 PM, Mario Castelán Castro wrote: >> Crypto is not like this. Sure, you don't need to understand Feistel >> networks or large number theory in order to use crypto, but look at >> what you *do* need to understand: [...] > > Is good if you know that, you will use the crypto bette

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 10, 2010, at 11:01 PM, Mario Castelán Castro wrote: The only crypto they use is the crypto that is invisible to them (usually https, which is pretty invisible). HTTPS is not invisible, is transparent with most browers. Invisible is as example, the logs that your ISP, mine or google (li

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread Mario Castelán Castro
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 January 10th 2010 in gnupg-users@gnupg.org thread "Web of Trust itself is the problem" >Crypto is not like this. Sure, you don't need to understand Feistel >networks or large number theory in order to use crypto, but look at >what you *do* need to

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread David Shaw
On Jan 10, 2010, at 10:24 PM, RobertHoltzman wrote: On Sun, Jan 10, 2010 at 02:24:22PM -0600, Mario Castel�n Castro wrote: Is not neseesary to comprehend cryptography to use it. In fact, the pknowledge of the use of one thing and the knowledge to use it are independient. I.e: don't know how

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread RobertHoltzman
On Sun, Jan 10, 2010 at 02:24:22PM -0600, Mario Castel�n Castro wrote: > > Is not neseesary to comprehend cryptography to use it. In fact, the > pknowledge of the use of one thing and the knowledge to use it are > independient. I.e: don't know how to ride a bicicle, but I know how > they work Tr

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread Robert J. Hansen
On 01/10/2010 03:24 PM, Mario Castelán Castro wrote: > Is not neseesary to comprehend cryptography to use it. In fact, the > pknowledge of the use of one thing and the knowledge to use it are > independient. I.e: don't know how to ride a bicicle, but I know how > they work Crypto is not like this

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread Mario Castelán Castro
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 January 10th 2010 in gnupg-users@gnupg.org thread "Web of Trust itself is the problem" >I get the impression that it's mostly a matter of their fear of not >being able to comprehend it. After all, it is a "computer thing". Is not neseesary to compr

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread RobertHoltzman
On Sun, Jan 10, 2010 at 09:27:14AM -0600, John B wrote: > On 09 January 10, Heinz Diehl wrote: > > > What I've encountered is that lots of people answering that way do not > > actually mean what these words say, but use them as a way to avoid saying > > the truth: "I'm not able to install such sof

Re: Inhibit pgp-agent warning?

2010-01-10 Thread Pepijn Schmitz
I know what was wrong now: Ubuntu puts a "use-agent" line in .gnupg/gpg.conf by default. I took it out and now the warnings are gone. Thanks to Olav Seyfarth! Kind regards, Pepijn Schmitz On vr, 2010-01-08 at 19:04 +0100, Pepijn Schmitz wrote: > Hi everyone, > > I have a backup script which use

Re: Web of Trust itself is the problem

2010-01-10 Thread John B
On 09 January 10, Heinz Diehl wrote: > On 09.01.2010, RobertHoltzman wrote: > > > Personally I think a lot of people care about privacy, but are just not > > > able and/or frightened to install something complex on their machines. > > > > Then you get the contingent that sats "I have nothing to hi

Re: very short plaintexts symmetrically encrypted

2010-01-10 Thread Mario Castelán Castro
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 January 10th 2010 in gnupg-users@gnupg.org thread "very short plaintexts symmetrically encrypted" >then there should be some sort of alert or advisory that the >plaintext should be a minimum length (whatever that minimum length or >alert/advisory sh

Re: Use DINSIG SmartCard

2010-01-10 Thread Werner Koch
On Sat, 9 Jan 2010 12:24:16 -0800 (PST), fava64 wrote: > Does this mean it doesn't work or does this mean that I did not understand > anything? That probably means that your card does not follow the DIN V 66291-1 (aka DINSIG) as implemented by scdaemon. Shalom-Salam, Werner -- Die Gedanke

Re: Import of old keys

2010-01-10 Thread Werner Koch
On Sat, 09 Jan 2010 22:46:04 +0100, Bernhard wrote: > May I ask another question: Which gnome/kde program let me generate > smime keys? You can't. What you can do is to create a certificate signing request and send that to a CA to send you back a certificate. If you want a GUI tool to create a

Re: very short plaintexts symmetrically encrypted

2010-01-10 Thread Werner Koch
On Sun, 10 Jan 2010 04:44:35 -0500, ved...@hush.com wrote: > symmetrical encryption is a simple way to avoid signing, while > still maintaining relative reliability of knowledge as to who sent > the message That is not true. For example you can't detect a replay or MitM attack. Further even r

Re: very short plaintexts symmetrically encrypted

2010-01-10 Thread vedaal
On Fri, 08 Jan 2010 15:03:53 -0500 Benjamin Donnachie wrote: >2010/1/8 : >> At any rate, it seems disturbingly easy to distinguish between >> symmetrically encrypted messages having only the word 'yes' or >'no' >> just by 'looking' at the ciphertext. > >i. Don't send such short messages >ii. Do