Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-23 Thread Robert J. Hansen
webmas...@felipe1982.com wrote: > i don't think this is correct. See: > http://th.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/People/lucks/HashCollisions/ It depends on what sort of threat you're facing. In this case, the MD5 attack is predicated on the victim signing documents they did not originate. This is of

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-23 Thread webmaster
> As of this writing, no algorithm supported by GnuPG has been > compromised. Even MD5 is still on its feet. i don't think this is correct. See: http://th.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/People/lucks/HashCollisions/ felipe ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gn

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-23 Thread gpg2 . 20 . maniams
Dear Robert On Sun, May 24, 2009 at 6:42 AM, Subu wrote: > > > On Sun, May 24, 2009 at 6:15 AM, Robert J. Hansen - r...@sixdemonbag.org > <+gpg2+maniams+ba4eefb302.rjh#sixdemonbag@spamgourmet.com> wrote: > >> gpg2.20.mani...@dfgh.net wrote: >> > What are the algos that are compromised ? or N

Re: Key Transition Letter 2009-05-21

2009-05-23 Thread Robert J. Hansen
gpg2.20.mani...@dfgh.net wrote: > What are the algos that are compromised ? or NOT to be used ? If this is > too long a list Sorry to be so late to the party -- As of this writing, no algorithm supported by GnuPG has been compromised. Even MD5 is still on its feet. That said, the SHA-1 and MD5