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David Shaw escribió:
>> Ok, and if I also add another pubring file, and I download a public
>> key, where would it be stored? In the default keyring, or in the
>> additional one?
>
> The first one that is writable. If you want to force it to be w
On Mar 5, 2009, at 12:32 AM, Faramir wrote:
David Shaw escribió:
secret-keyring z:\gpghome\secring.gpg
(that's the location of the secring that has the unedited keys)
But my question is: what does that line do? When it is in
gpg.conf, do
I have the 2 secrings at the same time, or it replace
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David Shaw escribió:
>> secret-keyring z:\gpghome\secring.gpg
>> (that's the location of the secring that has the unedited keys)
>>
>> But my question is: what does that line do? When it is in gpg.conf, do
>> I have the 2 secrings at the same time,
On Mar 4, 2009, at 11:20 PM, Faramir wrote:
Well, I followed the tutorial that shows how to use just subkeys
(without the main key), in order to keep the main key a bit safer than
usual. But that made me play a bit with the GPGShell options for GPG,
and managed to make it work, allowing to easil
On Mar 4, 2009, at 9:17 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
David Shaw wrote:
Indeed, and also (in the US at least), the attorneys for each side
can (to a limited degree that varies from situation to situation)
remove people from the "potential juror" list after interviewing them
(a "Voir Dire" challen
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
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Well, I followed the tutorial that shows how to use just subkeys
(without the main key), in order to keep the main key a bit safer than
usual. But that made me play a bit with the GPGShell options for GPG,
and managed to make it work, allowing to eas
David Shaw wrote:
> Indeed, and also (in the US at least), the attorneys for each side
> can (to a limited degree that varies from situation to situation)
> remove people from the "potential juror" list after interviewing them
> (a "Voir Dire" challenge).
Voir dire is the name given to the intervi
On Wed, Mar 04, 2009 at 05:46:38PM -0500, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
> David Shaw wrote:
> > I suspect things would go rather like this:
> > http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptogra...@metzdowd.com/msg10391.html
>
> Perry is an optimist. It's considerably worse than he makes it out to be.
>
> Judges a
David Shaw wrote:
> I suspect things would go rather like this:
> http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptogra...@metzdowd.com/msg10391.html
Perry is an optimist. It's considerably worse than he makes it out to be.
Judges are not idiots. They are very well-trained and have a great deal
of experience a
Hi all. I'm new here, so please be gentle =). I've read the information
about getting gpg-agent to work. I don't use X, but I login remotely with
ssh (publickey authentication). My gpg-agent is acting funny. after ssh
login, I get this error
--
fel...@suse-amd:~> gpg-agent
gpg-agent[32408]: can't c
gerry_lowry (alliston ontario canada) wrote:
> on vedaal's laptop design ...
>
> [5] marry the drive to the motherboard so that removing the drive
> to another computer would cause the drive to self destruct.
>
> [6] design the drive as a secondary only never bootable drive;
>
On Wed, Mar 04, 2009 at 10:38:23AM -0500, ved...@hush.com wrote:
> >Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2009 19:21:46 -0500
> >From: David Shaw
> >Subject: Re: surrendering one's passphrase to authorities
>
> >> Folks on this list have said for years that rubber-hose key
> >extraction
> >> is orders of magnitude f
On Wed, Mar 04, 2009 at 10:51:39AM +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Wed, 4 Mar 2009 05:58, ds...@jabberwocky.com said:
>
> > This is not currently possible. It seems like it should be (the
> > principle of least surprise dictates that it should work with anything
> > that can be passed to '-r').
>
on vedaal's laptop design ...
[5] marry the drive to the motherboard so that removing the drive
to another computer would cause the drive to self destruct.
[6] design the drive as a secondary only never bootable drive;
it's sister drive would carry the O/S and detect any O/S
>Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2009 19:21:46 -0500
>From: David Shaw
>Subject: Re: surrendering one's passphrase to authorities
>> Folks on this list have said for years that rubber-hose key
>extraction
>> is orders of magnitude faster than brute-force computation.
>
>... and cue the XKCD: http://www.xkcd.co
On Tue, Mar 03, 2009 at 05:12:23PM -0500, David Shaw wrote:
> It's an odd case. Law enforcement *knows* what is on the laptop in
> this case. They saw it there before the computer was powered down
> (thus locking the drive). They are arguing over whether the
> protection against self-incriminati
On Wed, 4 Mar 2009 05:58, ds...@jabberwocky.com said:
> This is not currently possible. It seems like it should be (the
> principle of least surprise dictates that it should work with anything
> that can be passed to '-r').
The reason it works only with mail addresses is that I don't see an
app
On Wed, 4 Mar 2009 01:58, lurkos.use...@gmail.com said:
> I'm new in gpgsm and I would like to test X.509 and S/MIME style encryption.
> Then I tried the "classical" --gen-key option to generate a new
> keypair, but this error appears.
> What's wrong?
> gpgsm: line 1: key generation failed: Unkno
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