Re: Key Revocation

2007-04-20 Thread David Shaw
On Fri, Apr 20, 2007 at 10:40:19PM -0500, Chris wrote: > I 'assume' at the "Command>" prompt I'd enter adduid and my new > embarqmail.com address. Yes. > Once that is done, in order to make it the primary key would I then > have to again run gpg --edit-key and my new uid and at the Command> > pr

Re: Key Revocation

2007-04-20 Thread John W. Moore III
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Chris wrote: > I'll be changing over to my new email address tomorrow so I want to make sure > I understand the procedure. According to the manpage I want to run $gpg > --edit-key [EMAIL PROTECTED] I'm then presented with this info: > > [EMAIL PR

Re: Key Revocation

2007-04-20 Thread Chris
On Friday 13 April 2007 11:36 pm, John Clizbe wrote: > Chris wrote: > > This may sound simple, but I want to make sure I get it done right. My > > ISP/DSL provider, Embarq, has dumped Earthlink as their mail provider > > sine 9 April and setup their own mail servers. Simple, revoke the EL key > > a

Re: Movies that get it right

2007-04-20 Thread John W. Moore III
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Robert J. Hansen wrote: > And while we're handing out movie recommendations, try for a 1974 > Francis Ford Coppola movie called "The Conversation". Easily the > best fictional movie I've ever seen about real-world communications > security.

Movies that get it right

2007-04-20 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> OpenPGP and GPG is about making the idea-based mathematic apparatus > suited to survive in the real world. If you want to see what it takes, > find a movie called "In ascolto" or "The Listening" (it was shot in > Italy by Italians, and was released both in Italian and English), it > is a somewhat

Re: Quantum computing

2007-04-20 Thread Janusz A. Urbanowicz
On Fri, Apr 20, 2007 at 01:57:46PM +0200, Anders Breindahl wrote: > Saying that ``there is no such thing'' seems harsh and as if you ignore > reality. The European Union put its hopes up for implementing a > ``quantum cryptography'' network of communications. That sort of makes > the term real in

Re: Quantum computing

2007-04-20 Thread Robert J. Hansen
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 > Yeah, again. I completely agree on the practical aspect of it, but > would > nevertheless like to see proofs of complexity that weren't > dependent on > the current models of computations. I don't mean to sound flip, but as soon as you invent

Re: pinentry - Impossible to disable/ignore if present?

2007-04-20 Thread Jules Colding
On Fri, 2007-04-20 at 16:18 +0200, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 15:34, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > > > So even if I prevent pinentry to show up it will eventually be > > impossible for me to provide my own callback function? > > I don't understand this. It is in general useless to tell

Key signing parties

2007-04-20 Thread Bruno Costacurta
Hello, are there some mailing list / blog / ..others.. where are mentioned key signing parties ? I expected to find something at http://www.gnupg.org/ but it seems this site does not contain any info about such parties. Thanks for attention. Bye, Bruno -- PGP key ID: 0x2e604d51 Key : http://w

Re: Key signing parties

2007-04-20 Thread David Shaw
On Fri, Apr 20, 2007 at 02:25:48PM +0200, Bruno Costacurta wrote: > Hello, > > are there some mailing list / blog / ..others.. where are mentioned key > signing parties ? > > I expected to find something at > http://www.gnupg.org/ > but it seems this site does not contain any info about such par

Re: pinentry - Impossible to disable/ignore if present?

2007-04-20 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 15:34, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > So even if I prevent pinentry to show up it will eventually be > impossible for me to provide my own callback function? I don't understand this. It is in general useless to tell gpg-agent not to use pinentry for a desktop machine. For a serve

Re: gpgsm --sign with smartcard?

2007-04-20 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 15:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > Neat, although I had to manually create the trustlist.txt file first. Already fixed in SVN - guess I should do a new release. Salam-Shalom, Werner ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnup

Re: pinentry - Impossible to disable/ignore if present?

2007-04-20 Thread Jules Colding
On Fri, 2007-04-20 at 15:06 +0200, Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 14:22, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > > > I find that pinentry unconditionally is being launched whenever I > > attempt to encrypt or decrypt something using gpgme. > > Depends. With gpg 1.4 you need to use --use-agent. But

Re: OpenGPG card indifferent places ?

2007-04-20 Thread Sven Radde
Matthias Barmeier schrieb: > I tried to investigate what the URL should look like, but I cannot find > an example. > Could you give me some pointers or hints howto form this URL ? Just tried it out to get a quick HOWTO: Export your key, upload it to some webserver (not keyserver) and note the URL

Re: pinentry - Impossible to disable/ignore if present?

2007-04-20 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 14:22, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > I find that pinentry unconditionally is being launched whenever I > attempt to encrypt or decrypt something using gpgme. Depends. With gpg 1.4 you need to use --use-agent. But if you are using gpg2 the gpg-agent is required and you won't see

Re: Scdaemon READCERT

2007-04-20 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 14:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > Does this command work? I see that Scute does not use gpg-agent or > scdaemon to get the certificates, but it invokes 'gpgsm --server' and > uses DUMPKEYS. That works, but I'd rather talk to only gpg-agent and > not also gpgsm in GnuTLS. gpg-

Re: gpgsm --sign with smartcard?

2007-04-20 Thread Simon Josefsson
Werner Koch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 14:03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > >> Use --disable-crl-checks to disable CRL checks. Also, you must put >> the CA fingerprint in your trustlist.txt: > > Or use --allow-mark-trusted in gpg-agent.conf so that the agent will ask > you whet

pinentry - Impossible to disable/ignore if present?

2007-04-20 Thread Jules Colding
Hi, I find that pinentry unconditionally is being launched whenever I attempt to encrypt or decrypt something using gpgme. I've checked that the callback function is being set correctly using a combination of gpgme_set_passphrase_cb() and gpgme_get_passphrase_cb(). Unfortunately this is totally

Re: gpgsm --sign with smartcard?

2007-04-20 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 14:03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > Use --disable-crl-checks to disable CRL checks. Also, you must put > the CA fingerprint in your trustlist.txt: Or use --allow-mark-trusted in gpg-agent.conf so that the agent will ask you whether to put it into trustlist.txt. Salam-Shalom,

Re: gpgsm --sign with smartcard?

2007-04-20 Thread Simon Josefsson
Simon Josefsson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > I'm trying to sign something using gpgsm and a smartcard, but here is > what happens: ... > Where do I put the CRL that will be checked? > > Alternatively, how can I tell gpgsm/dirmngr to not check any CRL? I solved this myself, sorry for the noise.

Re: OpenGPG card indifferent places ?

2007-04-20 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 12:07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > I tried to investigate what the URL should look like, but I cannot find > an example. > Could you give me some pointers or hints howto form this URL ? http://myhome.foo/mykey.asc is a good choice. I consider it a good idea to have one's own

Scdaemon READCERT

2007-04-20 Thread Simon Josefsson
Does this command work? I see that Scute does not use gpg-agent or scdaemon to get the certificates, but it invokes 'gpgsm --server' and uses DUMPKEYS. That works, but I'd rather talk to only gpg-agent and not also gpgsm in GnuTLS. This is what I tried: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ gpg-connect-agent SC

gpgsm --sign with smartcard?

2007-04-20 Thread Simon Josefsson
I'm trying to sign something using gpgsm and a smartcard, but here is what happens: [EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ gpgsm --sign -u BD:5F:80:DE:63:03:4E:C9:E2:84:1E:63:09:55:2E:34:5C:5F:22:6F dirmngr[21860]: error opening `/home/jas/.gnupg/dirmngr_ldapservers.conf': No such file or directory dirmngr[21860]

Re: Quantum computing

2007-04-20 Thread Anders Breindahl
[ Please interrupt if this is getting too off-topic. ] On 200704200441, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Anders Breindahl wrote: > > Well. Yeah. But the thing that was and is fascinating about cryptography > > is that it -- assuming some model of computing -- is ``provable too > > hard'' to bypass. I'm w

Re: OpenGPG card indifferent places ?

2007-04-20 Thread Matthias Barmeier
Werner Koch wrote: > On Thu, 19 Apr 2007 23:25, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > > >> Ooops, just checked. Secret key on the keyring contains the stub. Export the >> public and secret parts of the card's key and import them on your home >> machine. >> > > The secret key stub will be automagically

Re: Quantum computing

2007-04-20 Thread Robert J. Hansen
Anders Breindahl wrote: > Well. Yeah. But the thing that was and is fascinating about cryptography > is that it -- assuming some model of computing -- is ``provable too > hard'' to bypass. I'm worried that the future holds in store revolutions > in computability that will shake those assumptions on

Re: OpenGPG card indifferent places ?

2007-04-20 Thread Werner Koch
On Thu, 19 Apr 2007 23:25, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > Ooops, just checked. Secret key on the keyring contains the stub. Export the > public and secret parts of the card's key and import them on your home > machine. The secret key stub will be automagically created. However itis required to impor

Re: Quantum computing

2007-04-20 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 09:09, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: > This is in contrast to quantum cryptography, which, IINM, is provably > uninterceptable (but, unlike traditional cryptography, has many > weaknesses beyond the purely theoretical ones). While you mention this, I can't resist to forward Perry E.

Re: Quantum computing

2007-04-20 Thread Anders Breindahl
On 200704191925, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > While I agree that commercial development _may_ lead to developments > in QC, I think it's equally likely that the engineering difficulties > will be insurmountable. Which means that, from where I sit, we > should just shrug and say "we really can't