Re: Prefered algorithms priority

2005-11-07 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
David Shaw wrote: How is the priority specified? Is it from left to right, meaning that an algorithm a left from another (b) is preferd in favour of b? setpref --->--->--->---> ? Correct, it's left to right. The algorithm works by eliminating any algorithm that isn't usable by all reci

Re: Prefered algorithms priority

2005-11-07 Thread David Shaw
On Mon, Nov 07, 2005 at 07:10:26PM +0100, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > Hi. > > As you probably know, one can set his prefered algorithms for a OpenPGP > key using setpref. > > How is the priority specified? Is it from left to right, meaning that an > algorithm a left from another (b) is pr

Re: Prefered algorithms priority

2005-11-07 Thread Lionel Elie Mamane
On Mon, Nov 07, 2005 at 07:10:26PM +0100, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > As you probably know, one can set his prefered algorithms for a OpenPGP > key using setpref. > How is the priority specified? Is it from left to right, meaning that an > algorithm a left from another (b) is preferd in f

Prefered algorithms priority

2005-11-07 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
Hi. As you probably know, one can set his prefered algorithms for a OpenPGP key using setpref. How is the priority specified? Is it from left to right, meaning that an algorithm a left from another (b) is preferd in favour of b? setpref --->--->--->---> ? Best wishes, Christoph Anton Mitt

Re: back signatures

2005-11-07 Thread David Shaw
On Mon, Nov 07, 2005 at 04:17:20PM +0100, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > David Shaw wrote: > > >I'm afraid I don't understand what you're asking here. How backsigs > >work? > > > > > And what is the "theory" behind them,... e.g. how do they improve security? Current signing subkeys have a we

Re: back signatures

2005-11-07 Thread David Shaw
On Tue, Nov 08, 2005 at 01:39:17AM +1030, Alphax wrote: > 1. I have a cvs version of 1.4.3, how do I issue backsigs? Backsigs are part of a signing subkey. You don't generally need to issue them, since they are generated automatically when you make a signing subkey. If you have an older key wit

Re: back signatures

2005-11-07 Thread Christoph Anton Mitterer
David Shaw wrote: I'm afraid I don't understand what you're asking here. How backsigs work? And what is the "theory" behind them,... e.g. how do they improve security? Best wishes, Chris. begin:vcard fn:Mitterer, Christoph Anton n:Mitterer;Christoph Anton org:Munich University of Applied S

Re: back signatures

2005-11-07 Thread Alphax
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 David Shaw wrote: > On Mon, Nov 07, 2005 at 11:55:02PM +1030, Alphax wrote: > > >It's a countermeasure against an attack against signing subkeys. >Basically, the primary key signs all subkeys. With backsigs, the >signing subkey also si

Re: back signatures

2005-11-07 Thread David Shaw
On Mon, Nov 07, 2005 at 11:55:02PM +1030, Alphax wrote: > >>>It's a countermeasure against an attack against signing subkeys. > >>>Basically, the primary key signs all subkeys. With backsigs, the > >>>signing subkey also signs the primary key. > >>> > >>>Without this, an attacker can "steal" a si

Re: back signatures

2005-11-07 Thread Alphax
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 David Shaw wrote: > On Sat, Nov 05, 2005 at 04:39:40PM +1030, Alphax wrote: > >>David Shaw wrote: >> >>>On Fri, Nov 04, 2005 at 10:15:16PM +0300, Pawel Shajdo wrote: >>> >>> Salve! Can somebody explain me what is "back signatures"? Manua

Re: CVS or SVN

2005-11-07 Thread Werner Koch
On Sat, 5 Nov 2005 08:04:53 -0600, Stewart V Wright said: > Can someone then please update the information on the web pages to be > relevant to SVN as opposed to CVS (I'm assuming that you're not Yeah, we should really do this. However due to our fully automated content management system it is n

Re: ECC

2005-11-07 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 04 Nov 2005 19:32:07 +0100, markus reichelt said: > I put the speculations aside and stick with the fact that the NSA > recommends ECC for government use. That's enough for _me_. There is a rationale reason why NIST (not the NSA) will go for ECC: The forthcoming extended DSA versions usi