[outlgpg] Questions on installing and using with Outlook 2003.

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi there, First of all, has anyone successfully installed this and used it with Outlook 2003? I downloaded the file, and unzipped everything. I put the gpgexch.dll file in one folder, and the libgpgmedlgs.dll file into the Windows\system32 direc

Re: I have the public key, but not the private...

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Travis C Newman wrote: > I had reinstalled a while ago, and forgot to backup my gpg files. I > have retrieved my public key from MIT's keyserver, but I don't > have the private key, so I can't sign anything. Help? > > Travis > > > > _

Re: Entropy in ascii-armored output?

check out . something like: $ head -4 /dev/urandom | gpg --enarmor will produce much better "random" output than encrypted output. encrypted output can be filled with information that is not at all random, such as partial body length headers. of course, base64 i

Re: Entropy in ascii-armored output?

Chris De Young wrote: some GPG encryption output (with -a, e.g. "QhRuM+W4xC9qnPvn") might be a good source of password material. It's random-looking to the untrained eye, but how random is it really? It > 1. I know that this isn't what you were asking but you can get the same result by using

Re: Entropy in ascii-armored output?

All that said, the bottom line is that if the source is random, the armor is too. He was speaking especially of encypted output which is theoretically near random, so it is fairly secure. If the password must be long, reproducable, and reasonably secure, using ascii-amoured output of encrypt

Re: Entropy in ascii-armored output?

On Fri, Jul 29, 2005 at 03:59:16PM -0700, Chris De Young wrote: > Hi, > > Some people have started to suggest that actually writing down > passwords, if they're kept in a secure place, might not be a bad > idea; the rationale is that passwords which can be considered "good" > are reaching the poin

Entropy in ascii-armored output?

Hi, Some people have started to suggest that actually writing down passwords, if they're kept in a secure place, might not be a bad idea; the rationale is that passwords which can be considered "good" are reaching the point of being un-memorizable. Assuming for the moment that this is the case (w