Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...

2011-12-14 Thread Kevin Chadwick
Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón wrote: > there is not > a magic button "switch_off" as SELINUX. and yet previously >> UID 0 can't switch off nothing only role admin can do it, and usually >> is not UID 0, in rsbac is UID 400. >> DAC WOULD NEVER be secure without RBAC. and yet this is DAC with chr

Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...

2011-12-14 Thread Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón
Let's play your game as you keep mixing up contexts and you're the one > making blanket statements not me and telling me you know what I know > better than myself. I merely said that methods of breaking RBAC have > been discussed and a kernel exploit is one of them. > > I haven't seen no methods in

Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...

2011-12-14 Thread Kevin Chadwick
On Wed, 14 Dec 2011 16:27:45 +0100 Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón wrote: When I have more time I promise to hunt the references out and send them to you. > I have never said to eliminate DAC. I just told that ONLY DAC as > openbsd do is a bad option and insecure. > You can substitute DAC with RBAC

Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...

2011-12-14 Thread Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón
when perl is executed as interpretation (perl mynastyscript) it changes his role to perl_role perl role has only the rights to open scripts marked as trusted, if the script is trusted, read is permitted and a change of role happens to user role is done. If it's not trusted, then perl can only do w

Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...

2011-12-14 Thread Alex Efros
Hi! On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 04:27:45PM +0100, Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón wrote: > I told you, with a secure TPE (so scripts fully controlled) tell me > how to write one kernel exploit under bash without calling external > code. How about $ perl -e 'exploit code here' or just $ perl

Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...

2011-12-14 Thread Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón
> I suggest you do some more reading at grsecurity.net or even the > OpenBSD mailing list. I haven't got time to hunt down the two references > that stick in my mind but keep your ears open and you may realise one > of the kernel exploits could/can/will do just that. Do you really > believe it's im

Re: [gentoo-hardened] New Server, considering hardened, need pointers to tfm...

2011-12-14 Thread Kevin Chadwick
On Tue, 13 Dec 2011 22:20:00 +0100 Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón wrote: > Give me an example of direct attack via memory as you say, accessible > devices and anything else said you before. I suggest you do some more reading at grsecurity.net or even the OpenBSD mailing list. I haven't got time to