On Sat, 2006-07-15 at 15:20 -0400, Mike Frysinger wrote:
> On Saturday 15 July 2006 13:41, Ned Ludd wrote:
> > On Sat, 2006-07-15 at 17:45 +0100, Daniel Drake wrote:
> > > The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our
> > > users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/o
Ned Ludd <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Not 100% sure about the noexec part as that might break upx which
> calls /proc/self/exe as part of it's decompresser routines.
/proc/self/exe is a symlink, and the permissions of symlinks aren't used
for anything. It's less than trivial (and I think impossi
On Sunday 16 July 2006 10:07, Josh Saddler wrote:
>Daniel Drake wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our
>> users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec
>>
>> It would be worthwhile considering making this a default. What are
>> people
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Daniel Drake wrote:
> Hi,
>
> The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our
> users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec
>
> It would be worthwhile considering making this a default. What are
> people's though
Daniel Drake wrote:
> Hi,
>
> The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our
> users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec
>
> It would be worthwhile considering making this a default. What are
> people's thoughts?
>
> Additional testing of this change woul
On Saturday 15 July 2006 13:41, Ned Ludd wrote:
> On Sat, 2006-07-15 at 17:45 +0100, Daniel Drake wrote:
> > The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our
> > users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec
> >
> > It would be worthwhile considering making this a
On Sat, 2006-07-15 at 13:41 -0400, Ned Ludd wrote:
> On Sat, 2006-07-15 at 17:45 +0100, Daniel Drake wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our
> > users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec
> >
> > It would be worthwhile conside
On Sat, 2006-07-15 at 17:45 +0100, Daniel Drake wrote:
> Hi,
>
> The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our
> users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec
>
> It would be worthwhile considering making this a default. What are
> people's thoughts?
I mai
Hi,
The local root exploit-of-the-week would have been unable to run if our
users systems had /proc mounted with nosuid and/or noexec
It would be worthwhile considering making this a default. What are
people's thoughts?
Additional testing of this change would be appreciated (just ensure tha
