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In general you should *not* rely on any information sent over such an unsecure
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# Mart Raudsepp (04 Apr 2017)
# Masked for removal in 30 days. Does not work with new
# gnome-base/gnome-shell.
# gnome-extra/gnome-shell-extensions-topicons-plus is a
# fork that has added features and works with modern
# gnome-shell that is suitable as a system-wide replacement
# package. Altern
Michał Górny schrieb:
I think the first reasonable change would be to deprecate SHA256. It is
pretty much the same algorithm as SHA512, except for different
parameters. It is weaker than SHA512, and SHA512 is supported on all
existing platforms anyway.
I think there is nothing wrong or insecure
On Tue, Apr 4, 2017 at 12:03 PM, Andreas K. Huettel
wrote:
>> while we're discussing super-strength hash algos, it would be cool to know
>> what's still missing for
>> * rsync-side manifest signing in whatever way
>> * verification of such signatures in portage / emerge
>>
>
> (and just to put it
>
> while we're discussing super-strength hash algos, it would be cool to know
> what's still missing for
> * rsync-side manifest signing in whatever way
> * verification of such signatures in portage / emerge
>
(and just to put it in a reference frame, I'm these days reading mailing list
discu
[Sent from my iPad, as it is not a secured device there are no cryptographic
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In general you should *not* rely on any information sent over such an unsecure
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