Glen, because I like control-loop metaphors for behavior, and think we are
very close on that issue, the more interesting question, to me, is:
"Why would we claim what Peirce claims in "What is Pragmatism?", that there
must be some things without a control loop at all?"
The answer is, I think, tha
Interesting. You've flipped my rhetoric completely around and suggested the
opposite of what I posited, and what I think is the only reasonable inference
we can take from Peirce's position. I posited that the things we *believe*
have loose (or no) control loops, whereas things with tight contr
Speaking of our need to take "gradations of certainty" seriously:
The Itch Nobody Can Scratch
https://medium.com/matter/the-itch-nobody-can-scratch-4d980e3ac519
I got itchy reading it!
--
☣ uǝlƃ
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group lis
Glen, Ah! It seems to me you are talking about the thing believed, while I
am talking about the thing itself... could that be what is happening?
You say that aether theory had a loose control loop when believed, but now
has a strong control loop when it is doubted. That would make sense to me
if y
