On 2012-06-10 19:24, RW wrote:
On Mon, 11 Jun 2012 00:37:30 +0200
Oliver Pinter wrote:
16 rounds in 2012? It is not to weak?!
It's hard to say. Remember that blowfish was designed as a cipher not
a hash. It's designed to be fast, but to still resist known plaintext
attacks at the beginning o
Would it be possible to make FreeBSD's bootcode aware of geli encrypted volumes?
I would like to enter the password and begin decryption so that the
kernel and /boot are inside the encrypted volume. Ideally the only
unencrypted area of the disk would be the gpt protected mbr and the
bootcode.
I
On 6/11/12, RW wrote:
> On Mon, 11 Jun 2012 00:37:30 +0200
> Oliver Pinter wrote:
>
>
>> 16 rounds in 2012? It is not to weak?!
>
> It's hard to say. Remember that blowfish was designed as a cipher not
> a hash. It's designed to be fast, but to still resist known plaintext
> attacks at the beginni
On Mon, 11 Jun 2012 00:37:30 +0200
Oliver Pinter wrote:
> 16 rounds in 2012? It is not to weak?!
It's hard to say. Remember that blowfish was designed as a cipher not
a hash. It's designed to be fast, but to still resist known plaintext
attacks at the beginning of the ciphertext. It was also des
http://svnweb.freebsd.org/base/head/secure/lib/libcrypt/crypt-blowfish.c?revision=231986&view=markup
145 static const char *magic = "$2a$04$";
146
147 /* Defaults */
148 minr = 'a';
149 logr = 4;
150 rounds = 1 << logr;
151
152
On 6/8/12, Dag-Erling Smørgrav wrote:
> We still have MD5 as our default password hash, even though known-hash
> attacks against MD5 are relatively easy these days. We've supported
> SHA256 and SHA512 for many years now, so how about making SHA512 the
> default instead of MD5, like on most Linux
On 06/10/2012 06:02 AM, Simon L. B. Nielsen wrote:
Has anyone looked at how long the SHA512 password hashing actually
takes on modern computers? The "real" solution for people who care
significantly about this seems something like the algorithm pjd
implemented (I think he did it at least) for G
> On 8 Jun 2012, at 13:51, Dag-Erling Smørgrav wrote:
>
> > We still have MD5 as our default password hash, even though known-hash
> > attacks against MD5 are relatively easy these days.
*collision* attacks are relatively easy these days, but against 1 MD5,
not against 1000 times MD5
w.r.t.
On (10/06/2012 11:02), Simon L. B. Nielsen wrote:
>
> On 8 Jun 2012, at 13:51, Dag-Erling Smørgrav wrote:
>
> > We still have MD5 as our default password hash, even though known-hash
> > attacks against MD5 are relatively easy these days. We've supported
> > SHA256 and SHA512 for many years now,
On 8 Jun 2012, at 13:51, Dag-Erling Smørgrav wrote:
> We still have MD5 as our default password hash, even though known-hash
> attacks against MD5 are relatively easy these days. We've supported
> SHA256 and SHA512 for many years now, so how about making SHA512 the
> default instead of MD5, like
On 9 Jun 2012, at 09:51, Gleb Kurtsou wrote:
> On (31/05/2012 21:48), Pawel Jakub Dawidek wrote:
>> As learned on someone else's mistakes, I'd like to ask for a review of
>> those changes related to random data handling:
>>
>> http://people.freebsd.org/~pjd/patches/libc_arc4random.c.patch
>
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