Re: Sysctls and privacy

2012-10-14 Thread schultz
Says who? Is this your requirement? Why? I meant I don't see how it can be done differently. If this is really a serious concern of yours, you have much bigger fish to fry than sysctl(8). Can you elaborate a bit more on this please? ___ freebsd

Re: Sysctls and privacy

2012-10-14 Thread Adam Vande More
On Sun, Oct 14, 2012 at 8:33 PM, wrote: > >> Here is the catch. I know I can read-only mount most static filesystems > from a template. However, the mutable ones have to be copied. > Says who? Is this your requirement? Why? > Because someone might know the program memory, cpu or network usag

Re: Sysctls and privacy

2012-10-14 Thread schultz
Did you specify elsewhere what a 'visible' does mean to you? - if this means network connectivity then you can put jails on the same network, e. g. the same address on a lo(4) interface - if this means a read-only access to the directory located outside of a jail then her4e is the tr

Re: Sysctls and privacy

2012-10-14 Thread Peter Vereshagin
Hello. 2012/10/13 12:09:39 -0300 schu...@ime.usp.br => To Peter Vereshagin : > > y > > Hello. > > > > it's a -questions@ here, right? (= > > Indeed. :-) Ouch! it's already not... But I Cc: there. Oops? > > What's a specific of the case? > > I need quite a lot of such "jails", with some being a

Re: Sysctls and privacy

2012-10-13 Thread Peter Vereshagin
y Hello. it's a -questions@ here, right? (= 2012/10/12 09:59:15 -0300 schu...@ime.usp.br => To freebsd-questions@freebsd.org : > In my system I use separate user accounts for running untrusted > programs at the moment. While many will probably argue that jails > are a superior solution, in my sp

Sysctls and privacy

2012-10-12 Thread schultz
In my system I use separate user accounts for running untrusted programs at the moment. While many will probably argue that jails are a superior solution, in my specific case its the inverse. I know FreeBSD is not ready by default to have multiple untrusted users in the system, at least from a se