Re: IPComp question

2001-02-01 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
> No, but the problem is that there was no increase (actually, no > record at all) under ipsec: IPComp. The number on the sending > side seemed right. The increase matched the ones I saw from > tcpdump. It looked like the IPComp packets either weren't > logged or wer

Re: IPComp question

2001-02-02 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
> What you pointed out below is true. But I am more > interested in the relative performance since the number > I measured were under exactly the same setup and traffic > condition. I am just curious why IPComp was _relatively_ > (and signigicantly) slower than most

Re: [itojun@iijlab.net: accept(2) behavior with tcp RST right after handshake]

2001-02-12 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>> for background (like when this happens) see previous articles >> on this thread. >> current behavior: return 0-length sockaddr. >Yeah, that is totally broken. >Hmm.. how long has this been the "current behavior" ? >ISTR at one time you would instead get the actual sockaddr of th

Re: proper way to test for INET/INET6?

2001-03-25 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>I'm wondering how one is supposed to test for INET6 support in the >kernel. Currently a few places do it in a somewhat bogus fashion >like this: what are you planning to do after checking IPv6 support in the kernel? applications should be written so that it would work on both

Re: Struct ifaddr initialization.

2001-04-24 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
> Please refer if_attach() of . > Iam unable to understand why you are constructing a string from interface name & >interface unit number ( ifnet structure members ifp->if_unit & ifp->if_name) & >storing in the data member of sockaddr_dl structure. Iam also confused why you are >storing the har

Re: gif tunnel woes

2001-05-11 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
hello, regarding to the note on: http://www.FreeBSD.org/cgi/getmsg.cgi?fetch=0+2538+/usr/local/www/db/text/2001/freebsd-net/20010506.freebsd-net the symptom is repeatable. however, it seems to me that the multi destination mode is poorly documented, and needs ce

Re: review request: network interface cloning

2001-06-27 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>The cloning API isn't quite that of NetBSD because the NetBSD API only >supported the creation of staticaly numbered interfaces which can lead >to races and starvation in theory. This patch instead allows interfaces >to implement wildcard interface creation via "ifconfig gif# create". n

Re: review request: network interface cloning

2001-06-27 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>It is printed to stdout. Since status is not printed on creation, it is >the only thing on stdout so it is easy to hand in a script: i see. thanks. >newgif=3D`ifconfig gif# create` >ifconfig $newgif 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 you may need to have backslash before #... :-) itojun To

Re: (KAME-snap 5064) Can I define a SPD per interface?

2001-07-02 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>I can only find a way to define a global SPD using setkey. Is it possible >to define an (IPv4) SPD on a per interface basis using KAME / FreeBSD4? >If not, are there any plans to add this in the future? >Is there any reason one wouldn't want to have this? no. do you want SPD per interf

Re: IPV6/KAME/protosw integration cleanup

2001-08-12 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>> >1/ removal of "control" argument from rip6_input and prepend control mbuf >> >to chain AS IT WAS DESIGNED FOR. This makes rip6_input conform to the proto >> >type for input. (I have not confirmed that the information in control >> >is a valid mbuf but it is an mbuf pointer). >> i don't see

Re: IPV6/KAME/protosw integration cleanup

2001-08-13 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>Please note that the ip6protosw is ALSO very broken unfortunately, you are wrong. yes, protosw is supposed to be protocol-independent. however, due to the nature of IPv6 extension headers (you can have infinite number of them) you can blow the kernel stack very

Re: IPV6/KAME/protosw integration cleanup

2001-08-13 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>Well what is there now is plainly unacceptable >I think that it was asked for as a VERY SHORT TERM hack. >But it has been there a long time... >I see no reasons so far to not make most of these changes.. well, you are ignoging our design decisions. they are all done for reasons.

Re: IPV6/KAME/protosw integration cleanup

2001-08-27 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>I have still not heard any reason for the varargs here.. >except "it's needed for portability".. >portability with WHO? portability with other *BSD projects (NetBSD, OpenBSD, BSD/OS, MacOSX maybe). >BSD4.4 certainly didn't have varargs there 4.4BSD did not have pro

Re: IPV6/KAME/protosw integration cleanup

2001-08-27 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>We are planning to fill your (and many freebsd hackers') requirements. just a nitpicking. - i don't think julian is in the position to set the requirement for freebsd. is he? - i have never heard from other people about (against) the use of varargs,

Re:

2001-08-31 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>By the way, RFC2893 has the following text: (snip) >Thus, people would say that KAME (FreeBSD) is not compliant to RFC >2893. i guess you did not check the original question. itojun To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe freebsd-net" in the body of the message

Re: kame ipsec vs. openbsd ipsec

2002-04-05 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>> 1. Has anyone else seriously looked at doing this? >> 2. Has anyone compared the OpenBSD and KAME implementations and understand >> their relative strengths? (e.g. is there some reason to work with KAME other >> than it's already in the system) > >i have summarized what some people argued to me

Re: MPLS

2002-05-31 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
if you want MPLS on BSD, check out http://www.ayame.org/. itojun To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe freebsd-net" in the body of the message

Re: RES_INSECURE and CHECK_SRVR_ADDR in resolver functions (IPv6 anycast response problem)

2002-09-22 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
> Yes, and I know why the restriction is in RFC 1884 and it > is a reasonable restriction. I don't think so, IP source address is easy to forge and it does not add any meaning protection. DNSSEC is the only way if you want trusted responsees. therefore, i agr

Re: RES_INSECURE and CHECK_SRVR_ADDR in resolver functions (IPv6 anycast response problem)

2002-09-22 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
>>> Yes, and I know why the restriction is in RFC 1884 and it >>> is a reasonable restriction. >> I don't think so, IP source address is easy to forge and it does not >> add any meaning protection. DNSSEC is the only way if you want trusted >> responsees. therefore, i agree with e

Re: suggested patches for netinet6/

2004-04-12 Thread Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
> >> > + nd6_nud_hint() is only called as nd6_nud_hint(NULL, NULL, 0); > >> > in some cases from netinet/tcp_input.c > >> > With these args, the routine is a NOP. I propose to remove it > >> > (and the associated field, ln_byhint, in struct llinfo_nd6) on other OSes we call nd6_nud_h