Re: PCI probe reordering?

2001-09-08 Thread Warner Losh
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: : I've encountered a MB that seems to probe devices in a less than desirable : order. There is an onboard fxp controller, but it scans the slots first, so : that the onboard controller is fxp1 if there is another intel card in the : box,

Re: outbound SOCK_STREAM - force source addr?

2001-09-08 Thread Alfred Perlstein
* E.B. Dreger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [010908 23:04] wrote: > Greetings all, > > Any way to force the source address for an outbound SOCK_STREAM? I > know that one can do it for SOCK_DGRAM... but I've found no way to > do so for, say, a TCP connection. It's not immediatly obvious, but you can bind(

Re: local changes to CVS tree

2001-09-08 Thread Mark D. Anderson
"Terry Lambert " <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Any chance of getting CVSup to transfer from a remote repository > to a local vendor branch, instead of from a remote repository to > a local repository? > > This would be incredibly useful for building a combined local > source tree from multiple pro

outbound SOCK_STREAM - force source addr?

2001-09-08 Thread E.B. Dreger
Greetings all, Any way to force the source address for an outbound SOCK_STREAM? I know that one can do it for SOCK_DGRAM... but I've found no way to do so for, say, a TCP connection. Example: + dc0 has 192.168.0.1/24 as primary IP, 192.168.0.2/24 as alias + an outbound connection wishes to "co

PCI probe reordering?

2001-09-08 Thread Bsdguru
I've encountered a MB that seems to probe devices in a less than desirable order. There is an onboard fxp controller, but it scans the slots first, so that the onboard controller is fxp1 if there is another intel card in the box, for example. I want to make the onboard controller fxp0 (since

Re: Kernel-loadable Root Kits

2001-09-08 Thread Andrew R. Reiter
:Instead of worrying after the module has been loaded it's much safer :to run the kernel in securelevel>=1 when modules cannot be loaded :without a reboot to single-user mode. : Not entirely true. They are called kernel bugs... Not the proper url for this, but good enough: http://julia

Re: Kernel-loadable Root Kits

2001-09-08 Thread Giorgos Keramidas
From: Sansonetti Laurent <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: Kernel-loadable Root Kits Date: Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 04:21:29PM +0200 > Hello, > > > Short question: > > > > Is there a way to prevent the kernel from allowing loadable modules? > > Yes, by hacking kldload(2). You can also switch the se

Re: What is VT_TFS?

2001-09-08 Thread Wes Peters
Terry Lambert wrote: > > Poul-Henning Kamp wrote: > > *I* worked at TFS, I even kept ref.tfs.com alive after Julian went AWOL. > > I'm well aware of your checkered past... 8-). > > I guess Julian might pipe up now about the use of the acronym > "AWOL"... > > > Now, remind me again why historia

Re: Junior Kernel Hacker task: improve vnode->v_tag

2001-09-08 Thread Chris Costello
On Saturday, September 08, 2001, Maxim Sobolev wrote: > I don't like idea to hardcode the same string ("procfs"), with the > same meaning in several places across kernel. As for your proposition > to use f_fstypename to set v_tag, it is even more bogus because > value of the f_fstypename is suppli

Re: SO_REUSEPORT on unicast UDP sockets

2001-09-08 Thread Vladimir A. Jakovenko
On Fri, Sep 07, 2001 at 12:00:50PM -0700, Terry Lambert wrote: >"Vladimir A. Jakovenko" wrote: >> Terry, I clearly understand all your explanations. Yes, we are living in >> real life and there is a lot of programms with bad design. >> >> But all what I want is possibility to receive UDP packets

Re: Kernel-loadable Root Kits

2001-09-08 Thread Sansonetti Laurent
Hello, > Short question: > > Is there a way to prevent the kernel from allowing loadable modules? Yes, by hacking kldload(2). You can also switch the secure level using sysctl. > With the advent of the kernel-loadable root kit, intrusion detection has > gotten a bit more complicated. Is there

Re: Kernel-loadable Root Kits

2001-09-08 Thread Peter Pentchev
On Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 05:43:41AM -0400, Deepak Jain wrote: > > Short question: > > Is there a way to prevent the kernel from allowing loadable modules? Run your system in securelevel 1 or higher. See the init(8) manual page and the kern_securelevel_enable and kern_securelevel variables in the

Kernel-loadable Root Kits

2001-09-08 Thread Deepak Jain
Short question: Is there a way to prevent the kernel from allowing loadable modules? Thought process -- --- With the advent of the kernel-loadable root kit, intrusion detection has gotten a bit more complicated. Is there a _simple_ solution to detecting the presence of a kernel-based root ki

Re: Junior Kernel Hacker task: improve vnode->v_tag

2001-09-08 Thread Chris Costello
On Saturday, September 08, 2001, Maxim Sobolev wrote: > No, it should be pre-defined, because otherwise we will be > unable to use strcmp() in a few places when v_tag is abused. So in these cases (which ideally would be eliminated rather than considered for support), why can't you do: if (str