https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=248335
Mark Linimon changed:
What|Removed |Added
Status|New |Closed
Assignee|b...@free
https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=248335
--- Comment #8 from Ed Maste ---
I suspect this ticket can now be closed with the addition of *_RESOLVE_BENEATH?
(Perhaps after also confirming that the man page adequately describes the
situation.)
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https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=248335
--- Comment #7 from commit-h...@freebsd.org ---
A commit references this bug:
Author: kib
Date: Tue Sep 22 22:54:56 UTC 2020
New revision: 366023
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/366023
Log:
Document {O,AT}_RESOLVE_BENEATH
https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=248335
--- Comment #6 from commit-h...@freebsd.org ---
A commit references this bug:
Author: kib
Date: Tue Sep 22 22:48:13 UTC 2020
New revision: 366022
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/366022
Log:
Add O_RESOLVE_BENEATH and AT_RES
https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=248335
--- Comment #5 from Konstantin Belousov ---
(In reply to Dan Gohman from comment #4)
So it would be like capability mode with dotdot enabled ?
I prototyped O_RBENEATH/AT_RBENEATH flags in the following diff
https://reviews.freebsd.org/D258
https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=248335
--- Comment #4 from Dan Gohman ---
Combined with O_BENEATH allowing `..` to temporarily leave the topping
directory as long as it ends back within the topping directory, one could probe
for any username under /home.
The behaviour which wou
https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=248335
--- Comment #3 from Konstantin Belousov ---
But user could only guess-check only his own username, no ?
O_BENEATH usage was designed to confine existing non-capsicumized apps, which
only need access to the known subset of the whole filesys
https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=248335
--- Comment #2 from Dan Gohman ---
As an example, paths may contain usernames. Usernames may not be sensitive in a
username/password sense, but they are in a personally-identifying-information
sense.
In my application, we have untrusted We
https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=248335
Konstantin Belousov changed:
What|Removed |Added
CC||ema...@freebsd.org
--- Comme
https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=248335
Bug ID: 248335
Summary: O_BENEATH leaks information about parent directories
Product: Base System
Version: CURRENT
Hardware: Any
OS: Any
Status: New
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