Hi,
Question on the following text:
"However, in the case where the EAP-TLS peer is attempting to obtain
network access, it will not have network connectivity and is therefore
not capable of checking for certificate revocation until after
authentication completes and network connectivity is
-Original Message-
From: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 12:31 PM
To: Nakhjiri Madjid-VXT746; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; emu@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Emu] 2716bis13: Support of certificate_status extension
Hi Madjid,
Comments inline below
Hi,
I would appreciate if you could forward this question to the list.
I have a question regarding EAP-TLS. I am trying to understand if it is
possible for an attacker to extract the EMSK from EAP peer memory (if
not protected) and plant it inside another EAP peer and establish new
child keys
