RE: [Emu] Crypto-binding in TTLS-v0

2007-08-14 Thread David B. Nelson
Glen Zorn writes... > I thought that the new method had already been defined > by a design team? As a process observation, the work product and decisions of a design team are subject to acceptance by WG consensus. ___ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org h

Re: [Emu] TLS 1.3 and other EAP methods

2019-01-28 Thread David B. Nelson
> On Jan 28, 2019, at 12:24 PM, Alan DeKok wrote: > > Some guidance would still be useful. > > My $0.02 is that the worst thing we could do is to publish EAP-TLS for TLS > 1.3, and to give no guidance for other TLS-based EAP methods. I have a > strong preference that *all* TLS-based EAP me

Re: [Emu] [lamps] EAP/EMU recommendations for client cert validation logic

2020-01-18 Thread David B. Nelson
On Jan 18, 2020, at 8:55 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > No. The root store operators make the rules. Standards that align with their > needs are the standards they use and apply. > > Nothing you say or do has any impact without implementor, and if you go > against the grain of where implementors a

Re: [Emu] [lamps] EAP/EMU recommendations for client cert validation logic

2020-01-20 Thread David B. Nelson
On Jan 20, 2020, at 9:29 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > I'm well aware the end goal is that on a 'stock' install of your OS of > choice, everything just works. I've outlined several times a plan to get to > that - and which does not involve shipping roots in the OS, but roots in the > supplicant t

Re: [Emu] [lamps] EAP/EMU recommendations for client cert validation logic

2020-01-20 Thread David B. Nelson
On Jan 20, 2020, at 11:51 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > > Whether we have to convince "the OS vendor", or just "the supplicant > division in the OS vendor" is largely the same thing. > > It isn’t, and there’s been zero evidence to support that conclusion, but I > can tell reality isn’t that convi