Re: [Emu] Idea: New X509 Extension for securing EAP-TLS

2019-11-12 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba)
How does a public CA prove ownership of an SSID? From: Emu Date: Tuesday, November 12, 2019 at 3:08 PM To: Russ Housley Cc: emu@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Emu] Idea: New X509 Extension for securing EAP-TLS On Nov 12, 2019, at 11:43 AM, Russ Housley wrote: > > Can the extended key usage for EAP ove

Re: [Emu] Idea: New X509 Extension for securing EAP-TLS

2019-11-12 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba)
Tim From: Alan DeKok Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2019 18:40 To: Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) Cc: Russ Housley; emu@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Emu] Idea: New X509 Extension for securing EAP-TLS On Nov 12, 2019, at 3:13 PM, Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) wrote: > > How does

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba)
So again, if NAIRealm is not bound to an organization’s public domain name, how does a public CA prove ownership of an NAIRealm? How is this different than ESSID? I don’t see how this improves assurance of a server identity. tim From: Emu Date: Monday, November 18, 2019 at 9:18 AM To: EMU WG

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba)
If the goal is not to improve identity assurance of an EAP server then what is this best practice change actually for? From: Alan DeKok Date: Monday, November 18, 2019 at 10:34 AM To: Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) Cc: EMU WG Subject: Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba)
configuration, that doesn’t change the requirement to manually configure the supplicant. So what are we actually trying to improve here? From: Alan DeKok Date: Monday, November 18, 2019 at 10:43 AM To: Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) Cc: EMU WG Subject: Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba)
So you’re saying an NAIRealm must be a publicly registered domain name? I agree, but just want to be crystal clear. tim From: Alan DeKok Date: Monday, November 18, 2019 at 10:57 AM To: Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) Cc: EMU WG Subject: Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

Re: [Emu] FW: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-03.txt

2018-11-14 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba Security)
Making it mandatory to use an anonymous NAI will be a huge issue in enterprise where the infrastructure, device and enterprise identity is owned by the enterprise. There is no proxy or third party provider. Seeing "anonym...@enterprise.com" across all network infrastructure is not going to be a

Re: [Emu] EAP-TLS 1.3 - TLS extensions and mechanisms

2018-11-14 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba Security)
I think mandatory support and use of stapling is a great idea. There have been so many changes across platforms the past few years w.r.t. status checks during an EAP exchange which has caused significant admin and end user headache. This solves that by making it consistent while adding the secur

Re: [Emu] FW: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-03.txt

2018-11-14 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba Security)
NAS would honor it. tim On 11/14/18, 8:38 AM, "Alan DeKok" wrote: On Nov 14, 2018, at 8:16 AM, Cappalli, Tim (Aruba Security) wrote: > > Making it mandatory to use an anonymous NAI will be a huge issue in enterprise where the infrastructure, device and enter

Re: [Emu] Notes on session resumption with TLS-based EAP methods

2019-02-20 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba Security)
Agree 100% Alan. Now is the time to fix this. -Original Message- From: Emu on behalf of Alan DeKok Date: Wednesday, February 20, 2019 at 9:03 AM To: John Mattsson Cc: "emu@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [Emu] Notes on session resumption with TLS-based EAP methods > On Feb 20, 2019, at 8:53