Re: [Emu] I-D Action: draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-04.txt

Hi Mohit, A P-256 ECDH public key does not _require_ 33 bytes. EDHOC uses 32 bytes compact representation [RFC 6090] and there are a lot of people arguing that HPKE should do the same. 3GPP 5G already uses the 33 bytes compressed format from SECG in SUCI (I wrote part of that specification

[Emu] (on curve representations) Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-04.txt

Hi John: I do think your statements below got some things wrong: a) Virtually all implementations of curve arithmetic for Weierstrass curves (including NIST curves, such as P-256) use a *lossless* representation of elliptic curve points, for which - in the case of the P-256 curve - no secure 2

Re: [Emu] Protected Result Indicators in EAP-TLS 1.3

Hi, These three alternatives seem to work for EAP-TLS. (2) seems the simplest from a EAP-TLS standpoint. But how do these work with other EAP methods now that we are taking about a protected success. I assume this will be needed in TTLS, PEAP, FAST, TEAP? The -13 commitment message could be se