> -Original Message-
> From: Jim Schaad
> Sent: 19 September 2019 07:28
> To: 'Alan DeKok' ; Owen Friel (ofriel)
>
> Cc: draft-ietf-emu-eap-tl...@ietf.org; 'EMU WG'
> Subject: RE: [Emu] POST WGLC Comments draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13
>
> I am going to come down on the side of no PSK shou
I am starting to come down on the side the EAP-TLS PSK should be specified.
- I think EAP-PSK should be phased out like all other methods not giving PFS.
- The security of the Dragonfly handshake used in EAP-PWD (and WPA3) seems
quite shaky ( https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/383 ), but I have not loo
> -Original Message-
> From: John Mattsson
> Sent: 19 September 2019 11:04
> To: Owen Friel (ofriel) ; Jim Schaad
> ; 'Alan DeKok'
> Cc: draft-ietf-emu-eap-tl...@ietf.org; 'EMU WG'
> Subject: Re: [Emu] POST WGLC Comments draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13
>
> I am starting to come down on the
On Sep 19, 2019, at 6:04 AM, John Mattsson wrote:
>
> I am starting to come down on the side the EAP-TLS PSK should be specified.
>
> - I think EAP-PSK should be phased out like all other methods not giving PFS.
EAP-TLS using PSK has worse security properties than EAP-PSK, I think.
> - The s
On Sep 19, 2019, at 2:27 AM, Jim Schaad wrote:
>
> I am going to come down on the side of no PSK should not be supported.
> However my issues have nothing to do with how things are implemented and
> more to do with the security properties of the EAP method.
I'm leaning that way myself. I'm no
Thanks Jim!
Below are replies to most of your comments.
>In section 2.1.5 - You are mandating support for resumption. Is this really
>what you are planning to do? If this is true then lots of the previous text
>seems to be off because this is not part of that discussion.
That is definitely not
