Re: [Emu] RFC 7170 (TEAP) errata

2019-07-23 Thread Michael Richardson
Alan DeKok wrote: > TBH, I haven't seen an implementation. > I suspect that the lack of implementations is why these questions are > only coming up now. >> My feeling is that it would be better to make the TLV length variable >> with the hash length. However, I do not s

Re: [Emu] RFC 7170 (TEAP) errata

2019-07-23 Thread Jouni Malinen
On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 03:12:15PM -0400, Joseph Salowey wrote: > On Mon, Jul 1, 2019 at 4:11 PM Jouni Malinen wrote: > > (2) S-IMCK[j] derivation when inner EAP methods in the sequence derive > > both MSK and EMSK (or even more complicated, if there are multiple inner > > EAP authentication metho

Re: [Emu] RFC 7170 (TEAP) errata

2019-07-23 Thread Jouni Malinen
On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 01:50:26PM -0400, Joseph Salowey wrote: > On Mon, Jul 1, 2019 at 4:11 PM Jouni Malinen wrote: > > (1) Crypto-Binding TLV format for the cases where the negotiated TLS > > cipher suite uses SHA256 (or SHA384, for that matter) instead of SHA-1 (and > > I'd hope all deployment

Re: [Emu] RFC 7170 (TEAP) errata

2019-07-22 Thread Alan DeKok
On Jul 22, 2019, at 1:50 PM, Joseph Salowey wrote: > [Joe] I'd like to hear if anyone has an implementation, and how they > implemented on a cipher suite that is not SHA-1. TBH, I haven't seen an implementation. I suspect that the lack of implementations is why these questions are only com

Re: [Emu] RFC 7170 (TEAP) errata

2019-07-22 Thread Joseph Salowey
On Mon, Jul 1, 2019 at 4:11 PM Jouni Malinen wrote: > > > (2) S-IMCK[j] derivation when inner EAP methods in the sequence derive > both MSK and EMSK (or even more complicated, if there are multiple inner > EAP authentication methods that have difference in whether they derive MSK > or EMSK): > h

Re: [Emu] RFC 7170 (TEAP) errata

2019-07-22 Thread Joseph Salowey
On Mon, Jul 1, 2019 at 4:11 PM Jouni Malinen wrote: > > > (1) Crypto-Binding TLV format for the cases where the negotiated TLS > cipher suite uses SHA256 (or SHA384, for that matter) instead of SHA-1 (and > I'd hope all deployments of TEAP would be recent enough to avoid use of > SHA-1..): > htt