Re: [Emu] New draft on mutual crypto binding problem

2012-06-28 Thread Sam Hartman
> "Hao" == Hao Zhou writes: Hao> Sam: Hao> This is a well thought and well written draft, it covers a lot of background Hao> and aspect of the attacks and mitigations. However, I have few comments: Thanks! You listed a set of drawbacks to EMSK-based crypto binding. Hao> A.

Re: [Emu] New draft on mutual crypto binding problem

2012-04-13 Thread zhou . sujing
Hi, Sam I have the following questions concerning your new draft on mutual crypto binding 1."What name types are supported and what configuration is easy to perform depends significantly on the peer in question." The issue comes when human beings are involved to verify a certifcate, but if the

Re: [Emu] New draft on mutual crypto binding problem

2012-03-20 Thread Sam Hartman
Let's meet Monday at lunch. We should try and get a count of interested people. ___ Emu mailing list Emu@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu

Re: [Emu] New draft on mutual crypto binding problem

2012-03-19 Thread Hao Zhou
Hi, Sam: I can meet with you and Dacheng either during Monday lunch or first afternoon session to discuss the options. Thanks. On 3/19/12 3:00 PM, "Sam Hartman" wrote: > Dear Hao: > > I was pleased to hear your analysis of areas where mutual crypto binding > may be tricky to deploy because I

Re: [Emu] New draft on mutual crypto binding problem

2012-03-19 Thread Sam Hartman
Dear Hao: I was pleased to hear your analysis of areas where mutual crypto binding may be tricky to deploy because I would like to accurately describe this problem space. I believe the draft covers most of the points you raise but I will definitely incorporate your feedback. I was a bit frustrate

Re: [Emu] New draft on mutual crypto binding problem

2012-03-07 Thread Hao Zhou
Sam: This is a well thought and well written draft, it covers a lot of background and aspect of the attacks and mitigations. However, I have few comments: 1. I don't agree that Mutual crypto-binding is the recommended mitigation and should be added to TEAP. I actually think proper server authenti