On Mon, Apr 23, 2012 at 09:18:25AM +0100, Chris Wilson wrote:
> On Mon, 23 Apr 2012 04:06:41 -0400, Xi Wang wrote:
> > On 32-bit systems, a large args->buffer_count from userspace via ioctl
> > may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
> >
> > This vulnerability was intro
On Mon, Apr 23, 2012 at 09:18:25AM +0100, Chris Wilson wrote:
> On Mon, 23 Apr 2012 04:06:41 -0400, Xi Wang wrote:
> > On 32-bit systems, a large args->buffer_count from userspace via ioctl
> > may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
> >
> > This vulnerability was intro
On Mon, 23 Apr 2012 04:06:41 -0400, Xi Wang wrote:
> On 32-bit systems, a large args->buffer_count from userspace via ioctl
> may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
>
> This vulnerability was introduced in commit 8408c282 ("drm/i915:
> First try a normal large kmalloc
On 32-bit systems, a large args->buffer_count from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 8408c282 ("drm/i915:
First try a normal large kmalloc for the temporary exec buffers").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang
Cc:
On Mon, 23 Apr 2012 04:06:41 -0400, Xi Wang wrote:
> On 32-bit systems, a large args->buffer_count from userspace via ioctl
> may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
>
> This vulnerability was introduced in commit 8408c282 ("drm/i915:
> First try a normal large kmalloc
On 32-bit systems, a large args->buffer_count from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 8408c282 ("drm/i915:
First try a normal large kmalloc for the temporary exec buffers").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang
Cc: