[DNSOP] Proposal for Namespaced Service Names

2022-10-02 Thread Jeremy Saklad
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 I’ve noticed that an increasing amount of invaluable functionality, such as SRV and soon SVCB records, relies on services being registered with IANA as described in RFC 6335. I’ve also noticed that, in practice, a considerable amount of usage reli

Re: [DNSOP] Proposal for Namespaced Service Names

2022-10-03 Thread Jeremy Saklad
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 My thinking is that people are reluctant to engage with the process for experimental or extremely niche applications, for better or for worse. Or simply because it is meant for personal or internal use: if a company initially wants to use it on th

[DNSOP] Private-use underscored DNS node name

2022-12-08 Thread Jeremy Saklad
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 BCP 222 sets out guidelines for using underscored DNS node names, which are important for any record that should not be mistakenly interpreted as an actual host. However, it doesn’t seem to set aside a name for private use, which would be particul

Re: [DNSOP] Private-use underscored DNS node name

2023-01-03 Thread Jeremy Saklad
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 In this example, there are two services provided by one endpoint, for a total of three domain names. Using "target.example." for the HTTPS record would incorrectly assert that it provides an HTTPS service for itself. It would also prevent that dom

Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Breaking the logjam that is draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https

2023-02-23 Thread Jeremy Saklad
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 I don’t expect ECH to be the only security improvement enabled by SVCB, and the specification itself is designed to allow additions like that without being baked in from the start. Any issues posed by adding ECH later are indicative of issues with