Hi, Stephane,
Sorry for the delayed response.
Please find the in-line answers and welcome your further comments:
* the draft gives the impression that it authorizes a new behaviour.
But auth. servers have been sending extra data (IP address of a MX target, for
instance) for years.
#Z.W. Yan:
Hi, Stephane,
Sorry for the delayed response.
Please find the in-line answers and welcome your further comments:
* the draft gives the impression that it authorizes a new behaviour.
But auth. servers have been sending extra data (IP address of a MX target, for
instance) for years.
#Z.W. Yan:
About the DDoS risk, it should not be worried so much because this scheme is
controlled/triggered by the recursive server (with a flag as NN bit).
In other words, the recursive server can get the piggybacked multiple responses
only when it wants and of cource it can disable this model anytime.
Good morning, Ralf.
At 2016-07-20 13:07:01, "Ralf Weber" wrote:
>Moin!
>
>On 20 Jul 2016, at 5:03, 延志伟 wrote:
>
>> About the DDoS risk, it should not be worried so much because this
>> scheme is controlled/triggered by the recursive server (with a flag as
2016-07-20 20:20:45, "Ralf Weber" wrote:
>Moin!
>
>On 20 Jul 2016, at 7:34, 延志伟 wrote:
>> I understand your points, but these risks always be there because DNS
>> response is larger than the request, like DNSSEC.
>Yes, which is why we have several proposals on h
name
RR and the related RRs under its domain. It can also improve the efficiency.
Zhiwei Yan
在 2016-07-20 20:48:07，"Ralf Weber" 写道：
>Moin!
>
>On 20 Jul 2016, at 14:36, 延志伟 wrote:
>> But anyway, let's go back to the scenario considered by our draft to
>>
