Re: [DNSOP] DNS updates and classless in-addr.arpa delegation/CNAMEs

2015-06-29 Thread Petr Spacek
On 3.6.2015 10:44, Mark Andrews wrote: > In message <556ea478.80...@redhat.com>, Petr Spacek writes: >> I would like early feedback about following idea about interaction between DN >> S >> updates (RFC 2136) and classless IN-ADDR.ARPA delegation (RFC 2317). >> >> In short, the RFC 2317 tells me to

Re: [DNSOP] Some distinctions and a request

2015-06-29 Thread Andrew Sullivan
Hi Ed, On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 12:51:46PM +, Edward Lewis wrote: > >It seems to me that, for any domain name, there are three things that > >are relevant: > > > >1. The namespace. > >2. The registry for that name (in the old-fashioned, not ICANN, sense) > >3. The zone at that name. > > I h

[DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread Warren Kumari
Hi all, So, there is a project underway to roll the DNSSEC root key. There has been much written about this, including SAC063 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-063-en.pdf[0]), a DNSSEC Root KSK Rollover Plan Design Team, various consultations with the community, many presentations a

Re: [DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread Ralf Weber
Moin! On 29 Jun 2015, at 22:48, Warren Kumari wrote: I've written a draft that proposes a different way of performing root key rollover that exposes who all has which key - this allows one to know that 99.8% of resolvers have the new key, who has the old one, and who will break. It does this by

Re: [DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread manning
This looks very much like the draft that Olaf, Johan, and I wrote at the same time MSJ was proposing what we have now. You might want to talk to either Olaf or Johan for more details. And yes, this will fail if any of the loopback drafts are deployed. manning bmann...@karoshi.com PO Box 12317

Re: [DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread Olafur Gudmundsson
There is much simpler way. Just add record to the rootzone that is only signed by the new key. If resolver returns AD bit it has the new key. All that is needed is to sign a Rrset for a long time and add it at to the rootzone and make sure no ZSK signs it. Olafur On Jun 29, 2015 4:49 PM, "Warren

Re: [DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread David Conrad
Bill, > This looks very much like the draft that Olaf, Johan, and I wrote at the same > time MSJ was proposing what we have now. > You might want to talk to either Olaf or Johan for more details. Don't suppose anyone has a copy of that draft? > And yes, this will fail if any of the loopback dra

Re: [DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread Warren Kumari
On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 5:59 PM, Ralf Weber wrote: > Moin! > > On 29 Jun 2015, at 22:48, Warren Kumari wrote: >> >> I've written a draft that proposes a different way of performing root >> key rollover that exposes who all has which key - this allows one to >> know that 99.8% of resolvers have the

Re: [DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread Warren Kumari
On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote: > There is much simpler way. > Just add record to the rootzone that is only signed by the new key. > If resolver returns AD bit it has the new key. > > All that is needed is to sign a Rrset for a long time and add it at to the > rootzone a

Re: [DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread Paul Vixie
Olafur Gudmundsson wrote: > > There is much simpler way. > Just add record to the rootzone that is only signed by the new key. > If resolver returns AD bit it has the new key. > > All that is needed is to sign a Rrset for a long time and add it at to > the rootzone and make sure no ZSK signs it.

Re: [DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread Olafur Gudmundsson
Atlas probes can help us we can even measure this from webpages, cellphones, OS updates can add a test etc. Olafur On Jun 29, 2015 7:33 PM, "Warren Kumari" wrote: > On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 7:28 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson > wrote: > > There is much simpler way. > > Just add record to the rootzone th

Re: [DNSOP] DNS updates and classless in-addr.arpa delegation/CNAMEs

2015-06-29 Thread Mark Andrews
Section 3 contains a obvious error "192.0.2.1 -> 2.0.192.in-addr.arpa." should be "192.0.2.1 -> 1.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa." -- Mark Andrews, ISC 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: ma...@isc.org __

Re: [DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread manning
Why, yes, I still do. (and it can be found in the IEtF archives) https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-trustupdate-threshold-01 As to why, perhaps I am missing the obvious, but if SUDSTA proceeds, does it matter if the origin IP of the root zone being served is sporadically distribute

Re: [DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread David Conrad
>>> And yes, this will fail if any of the loopback drafts are deployed. >> Sorry, I must be missing something obvious. Why? > As to why, perhaps I am missing the obvious, but if SUDSTA proceeds, does it > matter if the origin IP of the root zone being served > is sporadically distributed? It se

Re: [DNSOP] Simplified Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors, for rolling the root key

2015-06-29 Thread manning
On 29June2015Monday, at 19:07, David Conrad wrote: And yes, this will fail if any of the loopback drafts are deployed. >>> Sorry, I must be missing something obvious. Why? >> As to why, perhaps I am missing the obvious, but if SUDSTA proceeds, does >> it matter if the origin IP of the root