Re: [DNSOP] regarding dnssec-key-timing RFC 7583

2018-09-10 Thread Mark Andrews
Firstly you can’t avoid dealing with time if you want validators to always successfully validate answers from a signed zone as there are coaches involved and the DNS is loosely coherent. The DNS isn’t HTTPS, you aren’t always directly dealing with the authoritative server or a proxy like you a

Re: [DNSOP] regarding dnssec-key-timing RFC 7583

2018-09-10 Thread Michael StJohns
Generally, CRLs work reasonably well for revoking intermediate CAs and leaf certificates, not so well for dealing with trust anchors.   CRLs work by the parent signing the revocation (and by being able to re-issue new certificates). Root certs/trust anchors by definition do not have parents.

[DNSOP] regarding dnssec-key-timing RFC 7583

2018-09-10 Thread shabbir ali
Hi all, My question is that instead of messing with the DNSSEC key Rollover timing and all that manual and automation tools dependencies, why not simply use a key revocation list just like a certificate revocation list (CRL) ? ___ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP