128 being one of the supported algorithms,
but one of the SHA-2 algorithms should be selected for MUST implement.
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ed a SNMP over DNS draft? :-p
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all the various actors here (resolver
> implementers, zone managers) so that it was more clear who was doing
> what.
I agree that the draft should be clearer on who needs to do what.
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Robert Story <http://www.isi.edu/~rstory>
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an A record response for the invalid name.
Similarly, shouldn't all three of these be "an A or record"?
The table following this text also only specifies "A" for responses.
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rt of static
configuration, or learned via 5011.
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nge the ISP's
reversing mapping, so a system admin can decide to mark mail coming from
dynamic27381.big-isp.example.com as very likely being spam.
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to reverse DNS requests, so the attacker appeared to
be coming from a trusted machine."
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sting even more time,
and likely resulting the the censorship being overruled.
Like I said, I completely understand your position, but the process is
supposed to be open. 3979 even explicitly acknowledges that IPR
claims can be "in some cases be disingenuous, i.e., made to
tion to root zone
operators is a bit troubling.)
Anyways, the basic idea is that there's no need to start the
flame-fest/endless arguments until it looks like there is actually some
support for the idea.
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authors and other proponents of the draft want to represent
the real world. In the real world, lack of reverse DNS can have
negative consequences. This is explained in the draft so that the
reader can make an informed decision about whether or not to provide
reverse DNS.
[1] h
ich I support), I think there should also be an exception
for the listening IP subnet(s)/localnets. eg.
server localnets { bogus no; };
Of course, there is also a difference between packets received from
outside the local net and inside. A local ip from a local server is
fine; the same add
ed. (i'm not sure bind wouldn't follow powerdns's lead on this
PV> topic, but i am sure that if there was an rfc, bind would have a similar
PV> feature.) so the key question is, have we got consensus on the behaviour?
Sounds good to me...
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associated with multiple domains. Anyone who tries using this method
would quickly for email would quickly find out it's a bad idea (see
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-982118.html).
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most mail from
dialups is spam.
You are quite right, however, that I would be daft to have a firewall
rule to a control port of a router that looked like 'good-guy.* ALLOW'.
But that doesn't mean that the first use is unreasonable.
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Des
rse mappings at all.
I think it's a reasonable thing to say.
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ring large zone files and such...
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RRSIG10(DNSKEY) RRSIG10(DNSKEY)RRSIG11(DNSKEY)
RRSIG11(DNSKEY)
Double Signature Zone Signing Key Rollover
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Descrip
G11(DNSKEY)
Pre-Publish Key Rollover
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